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ABSTRACT
Bodily Poetics: The Rhetorical Politics of the Self
by
Allison Renée Kaminsky
Dr. Donovan Conley, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor o f Communieation Studies 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis will examine different ways people eonsciously manipulate their 
bodies in order to express selfhood, artieulate identities, fulfill desires, and signal social 
and political commitments. The major premise o f this research is that bodies are 
rhetorically constructed through a series o f  fundamental assumptions about selfhood, 
social ideals and aeeeptability, and political struggle. This paper argues that there are no a 
priori distinctions between the various practices and meanings o f  body modification. The 
way we think about body modification is based on a series o f assumptions that define 
each practice. This project will look at three different groupings o f modification 
organized around the subjective desires they express: Those articulating desires about 1) 
Interiority; 2) Acceptability; and 3) Struggle. 1 problematize the assumptions underlying 
these practices in order to gain insight into the sheer rhetoricity o f the body, and to 
exemplify the central role rhetoric has in framing the uses and functions o f our bodies.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Western culture articulates the human body in strange ways. Classic children’s 
stories signify characters’ inner selves with outward appearances, joining the aesthetic 
quality of the human form with an ethie o f inner worth. It is no coincidence that Glenda, 
the “good” witch in “The Wizard o f Oz,” is a young, beautiful woman, whereas the 
Wicked Witch of the West— who does not even merit a real name— possesses gnarled, 
inhuman-like physical features. Other tales, such as “The Ugly Duckling.” link 
attractiveness with happiness and social aeeeptanee. Children who are told this story 
understand that while the duckling was never inherently bad or evil, it was not until his 
transformation into a beautiful swan that he was treated fairly and accepted among his 
peers. The widely known myth o f the fountain o f youth tells a story o f a mystical spring 
that Hows with the “water o f lite.” Drinking this water will not just ensure longevity, but 
will restore the “desirable” physical qualities o f youthfulness, situating these qualities as 
ideal. Then, o f course, there’s Barbie, the world’s most well-known and best selling doll. 
The original model is a tall, slender, Caucasian woman with blonde hair, large breasts, 
wide hips, and a tiny waist. Presenting an unattainable and unrealistic body type to young 
children— it has been said that if Barbie were made to scale, she would be 7’2” at 115
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pounds— the doll has sparked controversy among critics arguing that the doll encourages 
poor body image and promotes stereotyping.
These narratives and images are common in American culture, and when pieced 
together they provide a picture of how our society understands and values the human 
body. Popular representations of the body equate beauty with happiness, sexual appeal 
with power, thinness with health, and youthfulness with success and magnetism. As 
individuals have come to understand the physical condition through these socially 
constructed narratives, it is clear that the human form has become a central medium in the 
construction and dissemination of social and political meaning. Individuals have come to 
subjectively evaluate their bodies and routinely use them to craft and project a desired 
self to achieve personal, social and political goals. The body may thus be envisioned as a 
dynamic text that both alters and is altered by its cultural context, making the body a site 
o f personal, social, and political struggle where cultural meaning-making takes place.
According to Mike Feather stone, the term “body modification” is used to refer to 
“a long list of practices ... to alter the appearance and form of the body” (“Body 
Modification: An Introduction” 1). This general definition posits that any practice that 
physically or aesthetically alters the human form may be construed as body modification. 
However, if  this is the ease, why is it that some practices are considered acceptable, 
productive, or even necessary practices o f everyday life, while others are considered 
unacceptable, unproductive, recreational, or even self-destructive? If one distances 
him/herself from previous experiences and personal biases regarding body modification, 
it becomes apparent that all methods o f corporeal alteration fall on a singular continuum 
of bodily practices. If the cultural connotations of the term “body modification” are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stripped away, acts socially understood as self-maintenance— such as bleaching teeth, 
coloring, shaving or cutting hair, and even dieting and weight training— may be placed 
alongside practices that are socially regarded as body modification— such as cosmetic 
surgery, tattooing or piercing the skin— or even body mutilation— such as self- 
flagellation or “cutting.” The ways in which we generally understand the body and its 
modification are cultural myths that are rhetorically produced and perpetuated.
There are many ways people manipulate their physical appearance in order to 
attain a desired projection o f themselves. Pop singers like Madonna and David Bowie 
have made their careers on the “reinvention” o f their images to coincide with the release 
of a new album. Roche Pharmaceuticals develops products like Acutane that clear facial 
blemishes, yet have the potential to cause birth defects and traumatize the liver. Dennis 
Rodman became famous more for his bizarre and sudden changes of appearance— 
constantly adding new piercings, tattoos, and hair colors— than for his athletic prowess. 
Cheers and Look Who's Talking star Kirstie Alley drew heavy media attention when her 
weight peaked at over 200 pounds in 2005, and has achieved her greatest fame for her 
dramatic weight loss. As the spokeswoman for .lenny Craig, television advertisements 
actually document her weight loss. And of course Oprah Winfrey's infamous weight 
gains and losses have continuously gained the attention o f the national media.
Body modification has also become one of the central obsessions of the reality 
television phenomenon. Programs like “Inked,” “Miami Ink,” “Dr. 90210,” “Extreme 
Makeover,” “The Biggest Loser,” and “1 Want a Famous Face,” for instance, follow the 
everyday dramas o f subjects engaging heavily in spectacular forms o f body modification. 
These programs fixate on the physical self “improvement” or enhancement o f everyday
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people, equating the very aet of transformation with success, happiness, and prosperity. 
The industry o f cosmetic and reconstructive surgery has capitalized on this articulation, 
presenting a slimmer waist, clearer skin, bigger breasts, and tighter skin as the paths to 
beauty, luxury, inner happiness, and even love.
Because of the growing accessibility and affordability o f plastic surgery, as well 
as the increased visibility o f such practices through celebrity participation and 
endorsement, Americans have become more willing to participate in spectacular forms of 
body modification and have become more accepting o f pioneering self-modifiers. It is no 
wonder that, according to the American Society o f Plastic Surgeons, American spending 
on plastic surgery has grown 38 percent over the past five years to reach $9.4 billion in 
2005.' Many Americans have incorporated intense self-maintenanee strategies into their 
everyday lives, bleaching their teeth, coloring their hair, removing unwanted body hair, 
and wearing colored contacts to attain a desired projection of their physical self. Recent 
technological developments have even made it possible for individuals to be sexually 
“reassigned” to match their identified gender. The voluntary participation in these 
processes can come from any number of motivations, but one fact is undeniably clear: 
Americans are obsessed with their bodies. More to the point, Americans have become 
obsessed with changing their bodies. Our society has become fixated on transforming our 
physical selves in order to attain some ideal conception o f what we think we should look 
like, feel like, and be like, constantly developing and employing new technologies and 
practices to “improve” our corporeal form.
With such emphasis put on the image, on attractiveness, on sexual appeal, on 
individuality— in short, on the aesthetic pliability of the self—“the body” has in recent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
decades drawn the attention of academics. As I demonstrate below, in recent years the 
pool of research on the embodied self has grown substantially across the social sciences 
and the humanities. Research on the body has become routine in fields like sociology, 
cultural studies, gender studies, philosophy, and literary theory.
Yet, while the interest in the body has peaked in recent decent, there has only 
been a limited discussion on its significance to the field of rhetoric. Further, though other 
disciplines have begun to delve into the analysis o f body modification, rhetoricians have 
thus far only acknowledged its presence as a marginal social activity and political 
resource. There has been some argument for the admission of the corporeal form into 
analytic thought, but rhetorical scholarship is generally far more interested in questions 
about “the subject” or “ethos” than on the materiality or agency of the self. For example, 
Bradford Vivian discusses the historicity o f the subject at length in his essay “The 
1 hreshold of the Self.” Though his essay clearly addresses issues o f both materiality and 
subjectifi cation, his discussion o f the “continual becoming of the se lf’ (304) omits any 
discussion of the body itself.
This project will examine different ways people consciously manipulate their 
bodies in order to express selfhood, articulate identities, fulfill desires, and achieve social 
and political outcomes. The major premise o f this research is that bodies are rhetorically 
constructed through a series o f fundamental assumptions about selfhood, social ideals and 
aeeeptability, and political reform. In other words, practices o f body modification are the 
products o f two interrelated forces: social norms and subjective desires, both o f which are 
discursively negotiated. Practices o f body modification are normatively thought o f as 
healthful or harmful, acquiescent or resistant, productive or destructive, acceptable or
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unacceptable, meaningful or trivial; they are socially categorized as functioning in any 
number of ways based on the individual’s intention and how that practice relates to a 
larger set o f cultural norms. It is my aim in this project to interrogate these basic 
assumptions about the body in order to open up space for the potential for the body to be 
meaningful in new ways.
Clearly, additional questions centering on the human body are necessary to 
provide a more complete understanding o f how rhetoric operates as a material force, and 
also how the physical can be seen as discursive in its own respect. The following section 
will illuminate the need to acknowledge the rhetoricity o f bodily practices and call 
attention to the immediacy that issues o f the body raise to the field o f rhetoric.
Rationale
Analyzing the rhetoricity o f the body will provide insight into how individuals use 
alterations o f their physical form as the raw material o f socialization, persuasion, 
identification, and resistance, as well as a site for the negotiation o f meaning and action. 
For example, in some cases, tattoos and piercings have qualities o f socialization and 
identification that signal membership into spectacular subcultures. Since it is commonly 
understood that the expression of difference is the primary communicative function of 
spectacular subcultures (Hebdige 1979), the practice o f adorning one’s body in a 
particular style can be understood to indicate commonalities among members of 
con esponding ideologies (Sweet 2005). Another example is the use of plastic surgery to 
keep or advance to a desirable career. According to Christine Rosen, many “executives— 
male and female— are turning to cosmetic surgery to help them stay competitive” (“The
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Democratization o f Beauty” 23). These professionals are using their bodies as persuasive 
media, convineing their employers that they are still motivated, vigorous and capable 
enough to secure or maintain a fast paced or high profile job. Modifying one’s own 
physical condition with the intention of personal, social, or political mobility can thus be 
seen as a strategic rhetorical aet of the self.
A closer look at how issues of the body are culturally featured and articulated will 
provide deeper insight into how discourse situates the body’s importance in society and 
how this status is preserved. Further, rhetoricians may gain a deeper understanding of the 
materiality o f discourse. Consideration as such will contribute to discussions of what 
Carole Blair has called “extra linguistic rhetorics” (“Reflections on Criticism and Bodies” 
273), the rhetorical dimensions of the human body, and the corporeal dimensions of 
rhetorical acts. Ultimately, through the investigation of these body modification practices, 
this project seeks to gauge the significance of the body as a site of analysis in rhetorical 
studies.
This thesis argues that there are no a priori distinctions between the various 
practices and meanings o f body modification. The way we think about body modification 
is based on a series o f assumptions that partially determine each practice. Whereas 
shaving our legs, trimming our beards, clipping our nails, and styling our hair are thought 
of as practices of good hygiene, there is no fundamental difference between these 
practices and those that are thought of socially as self-mutilation, such as facial piercing, 
scarification, and suspension tactics. These distinctions are rhetorical constructions. If  we 
do not presume that these practices have presupposed categorical differences, we may 
then understand these physical manipulations as existing on a sliding continuum of body
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modification practices, all of which are fundamentally similar, distinct only in the 
meanings we attach to them.
In order to make this argument, the project will look at three different groupings 
o f modification organized around the subjective desires— the intentions and 
motivations—they express: Those articulating desires about 1) Interiority; 2) 
Acceptability; and 3) Struggle. Intentionality, an inherently problematic term, is used 
here to the extent that we have an awareness of our own choices and actions.  ^This 
project is based on the assumption that cultural practices shape and are shaped by their 
social and political realities, thus linking materiality with subjectivity. 1 envision the two 
to be mutually co-constitutive, each influencing and constraining the other. The project 
will deconstruct the assumptions and beliefs underwriting these practices o f modification 
in order to reveal how these practices are assigned meaning. 1 problematize the 
assumptions underlying these practices in order to gain new insight into the rhetorical 
politics o f the body. In deconstructing the assumptions driving the various practices of 
modification, my goal is not to trivialize or discount them. Rather, 1 want to argue that 
how these practices matter is often misrepresented and/or misunderstood by both the 
modifier and spectator. It is only after we have critically examined the underlying cultural 
norms and beliefs o f the body and its practices o f modification that we can salvage 
alternative meanings and inventional tactics.
For the purpose o f analysis, this project will focus only on the subject of 
voluntary and intentional body modification. Because of the dynamic nature of the 
human body, this focus makes the distinction between the ""naturar evolution and 
transformation of the body through time and space, on the one hand, and the 'dntentionar
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practice o f altering one’s own physical form on the other. In other words, my 
conceptualization o f body modification separates the natural development o f the human 
form from infancy to adulthood from those cultural practices that aesthetically transform 
the body through imposed or external means. This focus also rules out alterations made to 
the body that are not carried out by the will o f the individual him/herself. For example, 
this separation distinguishes between the sears of a burn victim and scars that result from 
a conscious decision to brand the skin.
Beginning at the level o f intentionality, then, I will examine practices as they are 
believed to function within these categories, and then discuss how these practices meet up 
with effects. In other words, 1 will juxtapose intention with effectivity and propose a 
nuaneed way of thinking about the potential uses and significations of these practices. In 
doing so, 1 aim to provide a new understanding o f the rhetorical dimensions of the body, 
as well as exemplify the central role rhetoric has in framing the uses and functions o f our 
bodies. Only after this has been done can the body’s potential for cultural and political 
signification be realized.
The next section briefly outlines relevant scholarship that assists a discussion of 
the rhetoricity o f the body. Further, it provides key theories that aid my conceptualization 
of bodies, body modification, and the ways in which the body can be rhetorically 
considered.
Literature R eview
Rhetorical interest in the category of subjectivity has inevitable, if  often ignored, 
ties to the body, as it is concerned with how individuals exist within and understand the
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world. Kenneth Burke’s famous definition o f man is eareful to point out, we are not just 
symbol users, we are symbol-using animals. Burke’s discussion of mortification, too, 
directly deals with embodied symbolic processes, as the deliberate acts o f “penance, 
abstinence or painful severities inflicted on the body” {The Rhetoric o f  Religion: Studies 
in Logology 289) are enacted as a form of purification or self-governanee. In her essay 
“Language as Sensuous Action,” Debra Hawhee discusses how bodies and physical 
expression are inherently linked. In this essay, Hawhee argues for a conceptualization of 
discourse o f bodily formation, as opposed to the body as discursive formation. These are 
but a few examples of how issues o f the body have figured into recent rhetorical theory. 
However, as Gerard Hauser observes, scholars have only recently begun to explicitly 
focus on the body as a uniquely discursive vehicle, and feminist scholars have lead the 
way (136).
While feminist scholars have studied the female body as a locus of meaning and 
experience, the discussion of generalized bodies and the male body has been a common 
topic for philosophers such as Nietzehe and Foucault. Such philosophers are considered 
as theorists o f corporeal inscription, and are attributed with “freeing the body from the 
subordination to the mind” (Grosz 12). For example, Michael Foucault conceptualizes the 
generalized body in relation to power structures.^ He states; “the body is also directly 
involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they must 
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to 
emit signs” {Discipline and Punish 173). Providing a notion o f power to which the body 
plays a central role, and arguing for a rhetorical situation in which knowledge, discourse, 
and power are indefinitely interconnected, Foucault’s discussion implieityly links the
10
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body to rhetoric. Also, his discussion of “docile bodies” as the site o f subjectification 
through discipline is heavily cited in academic works regarding the body. His work set 
the stage for the more recent studies on the body.
Judith Butler is the foremost player in feminist literature regarding the reading of 
the body. Butler posits that there is no “real” gender, but that gender is a set of 
strategically manipulated signs and codes imposed on the mind and body (“Gender 
Trouble” 1990). This approach views gender, and thus the gendered body, as a cultural 
construct. In her later work, Butler complicates traditional conceptions o f the body, 
stating that sex is “an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time” 
(“Bodies that Matter” 1 ). She argues that the body cannot be seen as extra-discursive, and 
that it and the body and the ways in which we understand the body are constrained by 
discourse. This argument is comparable with theories of innovative rhetorical thinkers, 
such as Maurice Chari and, who conceptualizes the audience as constituted by discourse. 
Both of these works are paramount in the consideration of the body as it exists within a 
discursive context. These studies, though helpful in envisioning the body as a site of 
political struggle, are limited in their focus on the female gendered body, steering the 
conversation away from men’s bodies, or perhaps the generalized or un-gendered body.
In another feminist text, Susan Bordo’s discussion of the body is threefold; as a 
medium o f culture, as a symbolic form, and as a metaphor (1989). She considers the body 
to be both a text of culture as well as a “practical, direct locus of social control” (91). Her 
conceptualization of how the body constitutes culture through everyday practices 
illuminates the constitutive rhetorical power o f embodied performance. Further, she 
discusses the preoccupation with the discipline and modification o f the female body to
1 1
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attain the aesthetic ideal of femininity as “the maintenance and reproduction of existing 
power relations” (93). This perspective envisions these practices as occurring within a 
context of patriarchal hegemony, requiring that women enact and reinforce their own 
submissiveness to a dominating male authority.
Scholars in cultural studies have also reconsidered traditional understandings of 
human body. According to Mike Featherstone, the body and its image are traditionally 
conceived in such a way that perpetuates the mind/body split. Featherstone argues that 
this understanding o f the body falls short of the need to envision the body’s “potential to 
vary, to be inventive, to be always in motion” (233) and is “open to ‘colonization’ and 
reconstitution through a range o f technologies and body projects such as plastic surgery, 
body maintenance, health fitness and diet regimes.” (234). The approach to an 
understanding of the body as a project is important for the consideration o f body 
modification as rhetorical action, as it situates the body as a malleable social process that 
is acted upon by the subject. Further, Featherstone’s perspective on body image 
reinforces the sentiment that “body texts” must be understood in social action. 
Featherstone breaks down modern concepts o f the body into two different categories: 
“body image,” which is the static image o f the body where its physical appearance is 
“based upon the body as an object” (234), and “the body without and image,” where the 
body is envisioned through an oscillation between subject and object, resulting in an 
accumulation of perspectives. Thus, in this line of thought, the body is thought o f as both 
an extension o f the psychological self and as a social object to be acted upon.
Featherstone calls for a further examination of the “unmediated participation of 
the fiesh in the image.” (235). He also argues that the presence o f new media enhances
12
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the role of the body in the “crucial creative filter o f images” and focuses on the body as 
“a framer o f information.” (235). He calls for a conceptualization of the body without 
image that brings the study of affect into the center o f our understanding o f embodied 
knowledge. Clearly, Featherstone’s vision o f the body as a project calls for further 
investigation into these projects as they are acted out and on how this is affected by how 
the media frames such practices. According to Featherstone’s perspective, the body plays 
a central role in framing information, thus interactively linking the mind and the body. 
This allows for a dynamic conceptualization o f the body that cannot be studied in a single 
instance. Instead, this approach requires that we understand the body as an ongoing 
project. Also, Featherstone’s call for an affective understanding of body projects prompts 
this study’s investigation into actual practices and how these practices are framed by the 
media. In doing so, this project seeks to understand body modification projects from 
within a contextual relationship to the self and its private and social existence within a 
cultural environment.
Hawhee’s discussion o f the body in ancient Greece is a helpful reference point to 
illustrate the intersection between the human body and rhetorical studies. According to 
Hawhee, the body and rhetoric “came together as bodily arts that reinforced and 
perpetuated the lively culture o f contact, movement, and sound so markedly Athenian” 
(191). She sees the body as playing a major role in the cultivation o f public knowledge, 
and when combined with language as having a constitutive effect on Greek society. 
Hawhee, among several others, advocates that the mind and the body should not be 
polarized, and that an understanding of one requires the incorporation o f the other. Her 
approach presents a useful model for considering the rhetorical roles the human body
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plays in the creation of social and political meaning. Though a helpful integration of the 
worlds of rhetorical, cultural, and literary studies, Hawhee’s discussion provides limited 
resources for an understanding o f how the body functions in contemporary rhetorical 
theory. Because o f the increased availability of information, the public sphere is 
bombarded with messages and images through which we construct our social realities, 
resulting in the constant shifting o f the state o f public knowledge. This condition makes 
representations of the human body widely accessible to the masses, potentially altering 
how the public consumes these images and how meaning is assigned to them. Clearly, 
any assessment of how the body functions in contemporary meaning making processes 
must make these considerations.
Carole Blair suggests that though the “material” has traditionally been understood 
as a characteristic o f rhetorical context, a “rethinking o f rhetoric as itself material” is a 
necessary move in rhetorical theory. In her essay “Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as 
Exemplars o f Rhetoric’s Materiality,” Blair posits two complications to a consideration 
of rhetoric as such. First, she claims that theorists have discussed rhetorical acts as 
defined by their symbolieity instead o f their materiality in traditional rhetorical studies, 
thus limiting the debates in rhetoric to the level of the discussion of symbols. This 
reliance on a model o f rhetoric as symbolic, she argues, is inadequate for critics “who 
have advanced other ‘units’ of analysis to describe rhetorical formulations” (19). Another 
obstacle that Blair discusses is the view of rhetorical practice as goal oriented and under 
the control o f the rhetor, which produces “an exceptionally narrow understanding of 
effect” (21). This traditional understanding does not account for effects that are not 
contained within the goal-orientation o f a rhetorical text or within the perceptual field of
14
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a rhetor. The negligence of traditional scholars to consider “that rhetoric is not 
exclusively about production” and that it “has consequences that exceed goal fulfillment” 
(22) is characterized by Blair as an “anxiety” about rhetoric’s materiality. Ultimately, 
Blair argues that it is the responsibility o f contemporary rhetoricians to acknowledge and 
understand the material forces operating beyond what is traditionally conceptualized as 
“effect,” and to recognize the importance of asking what a text does as opposed to what it 
means. Since Blair observes that different “degrees, kinds, and consequences of 
materiality seem to differ significantly, but rather unpredictably” (17), she suggests that 
rhetoricians should attend to “instances o f rhetoric and what they can tell us about their 
own materiality” (23). In other words, she advocates an analysis that is unique to the 
study o f the cultural object and favors effectivity over contextually-oriented emphasis on 
effectivity over effect.
Though Blair suggests that “rhetoric o f all kinds acts on the whole person—body 
as well as mind” (46), she offers little direct analysis o f the body itself. However, her 
work provides a useful “way in” for the study o f the human body as rhetoric. Blair offers 
a series o f questions that prove to be useful in the consideration o f the material as 
rhetoric.'^ In addition, she centralizes the notion o f effectivity, as opposed to effect, in the 
study o f material rhetoric, thus offering a way to talk about the rhetorical properties of 
cultural meanings.
Gerard Hauser’s discussion of bodily pain presents a useful argument for the 
incorporation o f the human body into the consideration o f rhetorical discourse. In his 
essay “Body Rhetoric: Conflicted Reporting o f Bodies in Pain,” Hauser explains that the 
body in pain has rhetorical power when combined with language. He argues that the
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“body itself is an ambiguous form of signification” (138), that when combined with 
context and words can be viewed as a site of rhetorical activity. He uses examples o f the 
body as site o f political resistance to illustrate this. He then turns to the topic o f publicity 
and asserts that how the body is framed in the public sphere alters the body’s rhetorical 
functions.
Also calling for a reconeeptualization of how rhetorical studies approaches the 
materiality o f discursive acts, Raymie MeKerrow posits that traditional approaches to 
rhetorical theory are unfit for a culturally diverse world, as rhetoric privileges “specific 
‘sides' o f diehotomous binaries” (315). O f the many binaries described in his article 
“Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric; A Site for Rhetoric’s future” is the mind/body split. 
MeKerrow asserts that traditional rhetorical theorists favor the mind over the body and 
argues that the general exclusion of the body from the discussion o f the public sphere is a 
hindrance to achieving a critical rhetoric of alternative discourse styles. He proposes that 
the definition o f rhetoric should be broadened to include what he terms “corporeal 
rhetoric” that collapses the binary of mind and body and “encompasses affective as well 
as purely cognitive dimensions o f the human person” (323). Once again calling for a 
focus on the material dimensions o f rhetoric, MeKerrow is a key player in bringing the 
physical to the center o f rhetorical study. Like Hawhee, his perspective collapses the 
dualism between the body and the mind that is perpetuated by traditional rhetorical 
theory, making the physical dimensions of rhetorical activity as important as its linguistic 
functions. Adopting the approach to corporeal rhetoric advocated by MeKerrow would 
involve tracking the effectivity o f rhetorical discourse, considering the performance of
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the embodied self as an important variable in the formulation and transmission of 
meaning.
Finally, building on Michael McGee’s fragmentation thesis, Ronald Walter 
Greene seeks to replace “traditional” rhetoric’s logic of representation with a logic of 
articulation in regards to the mass media.^ Because McGee’s thesis leaves the task o f text 
construction to the critic, Greene suggests that the meanings o f social texts do not lie in 
how their fragments represent reality, but rather in the articulation of these fragments into 
“a structure of signification.” (34). In other words, this approach posits that a text’s 
meaning is determined by where it is located and how it moves within networks of power 
and usage. Greene suggests, then, that in order to discover a text’s significance, criticism 
should be concerned with the mapping of power relations. This perspective emphasizes a 
text’s relation to a larger cultural discourse, and suggests that the meaning o f a text is 
determined by where and how it is articulated within this larger context. Meaning, he 
argues, is a rhetorical effect o f this articulation, which “generates the possibility of 
rematerializing the political, economic, cultural and affective structures of public 
deliberation as sites o f rhetorical effectivity” (35). Greene suggests that critics should 
turn their attention to “how rhetorical practices create the conditions o f possibility ... to 
judge and program reality” (22). In other words, Greene’s call for a new materialist 
rhetoric weighs the importance o f rhetorical effectivity in a broad range o f social 
institutions. The materiality o f rhetorical practices lies in how texts function politically 
and aesthetically to figure the process o f subjectivity. Greene’s perspective is important 
as it addresses the problem of accessibility in the meaning-making process. Rhetoric 
functions, then, as a method o f making resources available for new articulations. In this
17
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sense, the representations of the body in mass media texts do not have a direct causal 
relationship to how the public feels about the body, but instead create the social 
conditions through which we understand and can impact our world. Further, this 
conceptualization allows for the consideration of the intertextual relationship o f physical 
bodies. Though assumptions about the body shape and constrain the body, this 
perspective accounts for the ways in which our bodies can be envisioned as providing 
new resources for the articulation of bodies within culture. Also, Greene’s approach 
focuses the attention o f the critic on a larger cultural discourse, thus emphasizing an 
analysis o f rhetorical function over meaning.
This literature review is meant to illustrate some key concepts and major players 
that will facilitate my study o f the human body, as well as feature ways the human body 
has been discussed in the academic world. The list is not a complete survey of scholarly 
theories and perspectives. Because the research is both ongoing, and interest in bodily 
issues spans several academic fields, such a list would be unmanageable. The book 
Rhetorical Bodies is but one source that attempts to bring a representative collection of 
analyses that deal with bodies in the field of rhetoric. This book features over a dozen 
essays that each link the study of bodies and rhetoric in different ways. By tracing the 
research of these essays, the editors of this book compile a list o f over 100 sources for a 
selected bibliography to aid the discussion on material rhetoric alone. Clearly, an 
exhaustive account o f such literature is unrealistic and unnecessary for this paper.
Further, the interest in body modification is also on the rise, with a growing pool 
o f literature that was not included in this literature review. For example, in 1997 the 
Theory, Culture, and Society Centre hosted a conference on body modification that
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featured papers on transsexualism, cyborgs, body building, and cosmetics. Also, a 1999 
issue of Body & Society was dedicated solely to issues o f body modification. Essays in 
this journal included topics on self-mutilation, tattooing, and modem primitivism. These 
are just a few examples o f the growing academic interest in body modification. Though 
these topics and issues are not discussed here, key players and concepts in this research 
area will be featured within the chapters o f this pro ject.
In addition to a review o f recent scholarship on the body as it is understood to 
exist within the field o f rhetoric, this project relies on some key methodological 
assumptions that guide my analysis. The next section outlines and details these 
assumptions.
Methodolouv
Taking my cue from Carole Blair, I will rely on the instances of rhetoric 
themselves to reveal the most appropriate method o f analysis. In other words, this 
analysis is designed to include an “organic” approach to the application of theoretical 
perspectives to the study of the selected textual objects and practices. However, as 
suggested in the last section, I work from certain critical assumptions that will guide this 
project in its discussion of the body as rhetorical.
The first assumption is the notion of what a “text” consists of, and how it is 
discussed here. This project is based on the assumption that the term “text” can be 
applied to objects and activities that extend beyond the literal written/spoken word. 
According to Carole Blair, the domain o f rhetoric can be expanded to “include cultural 
practices and artifacts beyond the spoken or written word” (“Reflections on Criticism and
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Bodies” 273). This approach extends the breadth of rhetoric to include any cultural object 
“including the full range o f media (visual, aural, and corporeal), ritual spectacles and 
social activities ... commodities, and spaces” (Bennett, Grossberg, & Morris 346). 
Understanding o f a text as such allows for the consideration o f human bodies and their 
practices as rhetorical and cultural instances appropriate for critical analysis.
In “Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,” Michael 
Calvin McGee posits that the fragmentation of contemporary culture has resulted in a 
shift in responsibilities for critics, from the interpretation of a text to text construction 
from a larger, uncompleted discourse. In this understanding, there are no concrete, static, 
unified, and completed texts; instead there are only textual fragments that are 
“assembled” by critics and situated for analysis. Though the fragmentation thesis allows 
for the isolation of incomplete fragments for analysis, McGee’s perspective suspends the 
idea of the object, arguing that “there are as many nuances of rhetorical experience as 
there are points in a line” (“A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric” 30-31), establishing 
a model of rhetorical effectivity that is virtually unlimited.
However, for the purposes of this project, incorporation of a more grounded 
method of analysis is needed to allow for the study of the body as it is understood to 
function in contemporary society. To achieve an adequate picture of how the body is 
culturally conceptualized, the “texts” featured in this study were chosen for the potential 
representative relationship between the style and content o f the text to the material 
practices it represents. This relationship, termed iconicity by Michael Leff and Andrew 
Sachs, is the principle o f form enacting meaning, or o f the “imitative relationship” 
between a sign and what it represents. Iconicity posits that “discursive form often enacts
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representational content” (Leff and Sachs 258). According to Leff and Sachs, “form and 
meaning [of a text] are imbricated at every level ... to produce a structure of meaning” 
(pp. 268-269). This approaeh envisions specific, self-contained rhetorical instances as 
they “blend form and meaning into local unities that ‘textualize’ the public world and 
invite audiences to experience that world as the text represents it” (270). This principle 
allows for the discussion o f the texts chosen for analysis in this project as representative 
of the material practices they depict as they occur and are understood in society.
However, this approach flirts with reductionism as it suggests that the essence of a larger 
cultural context is condensed within an isolated fragment.
In other words, since the world is ever changing and the dynamics of effectivity 
are ongoing and multidirectional, I cannot assume that a cultural object, whether it is 
considered as a textual fragment or a complete text, is iconically representative o f the 
reality from which it is extracted. Because o f this, my project attempts to meld the two 
approaches o f McGee and Leff. Since a studied text has at once the potential to be 
exemplary o f a larger cultural discourse and/or to become something entirely different, 
this project oscillates between perspectives that look at representative texts (Left) and 
unfinished textual fragments that exist within a larger cultural discourse (McGee). 
Following the lead o f McGee, this project rejects the conceptualization of text as a 
“finished discourse anticipated in consequence o f an essentially homogenous culture” and 
assumes that “changing cultural conditions have made it virtually impossible to construct 
a whole and harmonious text” (287). However, by adopting the principle o f iconicity as 
forwarded by Leff and Sach, this project assumes that fragments o f a larger, unfinished 
text can be envisioned as iconic, and thus contain important dimensions o f the larger
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discourse within the analyzed object. In other words, though text and context are not 
assumed to be one and the same, this project considers the cultural object (or process in 
this case) as an artifact that simultaneously determines and is determined by the reality in 
which it exists.
This conceptualization allows for the consideration of the body as a dynamic 
medium of constantly changing movements, practices, and significations. The human 
body is understood to be an incomplete text, an ongoing process o f identity construction 
and meaning-making that exists in an “intertextual” relation with a multiplicity o f other 
objects, mediums, and cultural practices. Practices o f body modification, then, are 
considered as they exist within a larger cultural context, and can thus be understood as 
“fragments” o f the textual process of the body as it exists within contemporary discourse. 
These “fragments,” or rhetorical instances, though not considered to be wholly 
emblematic of this discourse, are understood to relate to a larger cultural “whole.”
Related to effectivity and intertextuality, this project approaches critical analysis 
using a logic o f articulation, rather than a logic of influence. Articulation is used here as it 
refers to arrangement and historical emergence, a linking together of elements in the 
creation of order and meaning. Nathan Stormer discusses articulation as 
“transformational and emergent, creating new possibilities through the mutual interaction 
o f elements where none existed before, augmenting by factors rather than by linear 
accretion, or diminishing possibilities in ways that defy rudimentary calculation” (264). 
Articulation, then, is the process by which discursive elements historically emerge in new 
arrangements o f meaning and practice. In her essay “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation 
from Within the Thematie of Differance,’" Barbara Biesecker challenges the traditional
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presumption o f direct causality, and calls for a rethinking of the rhetorical situation “on a 
trajectory o f becoming rather than Being” (127). This approach posits that, instead of 
being characterized by causality, rhetorical events should be defined by their 
indeterminate possibilities. In other words, Biesecker envisions the rhetorical situation as 
a set of artieulations that contain the possibility o f new thoughts, expressions, and 
behaviors.
When assuming a logic o f articulation, a rhetorical text is understood as existing 
within ongoing networks o f effectivity. This perspective understands the material 
practices o f body modification as producing and being produced by material effects 
within an “unequally and unstably organized field o f tendential forces and struggles” 
(Grossberg, “Wandering Audiences, Nomadic Critics” 383). Building on this, Greene’s 
discussion o f a logic o f articulation in materialist rhetoric focuses on “how rhetorical 
practices create the conditions o f possibility” (22). In adopting a logic of articulation in 
my critical analysis, this project does not assume a direct causal influence between media 
texts and the body, but instead views both as sites o f articulation between the interaction 
and intersection of material effects. The task, then, becomes locating the rhetorical 
instance and determining how it functions in relation to other instances and to larger 
structures o f power.
Finally, this project is framed through a philosophy of materialism that is based 
on the assumption that cultural practices shape and are shaped by their social and political 
realities, thus linking materiality with subjectivity. The two principles, however, are 
assumed to be mutually supportive and co-constitutive. This project embraces a view of 
materiality that “addresses the world o f people in social, cultural, political, technological.
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and economic relations; it talks about people with ideas, desires, pleasures, and emotions, 
all o f which are defined by the forms and organizations o f practices that are available to 
transform these dimensions of reality” (Grossberg, as cited in Blair 289). 1 want to 
examine the ways that subjectivity and materiality are mutually constitutive. This paper is 
based on the assumption that individual “agency is communal, social, cooperative, and 
participatory and, simultaneously, constituted and constrained by the material and 
symbolic elements of context and culture” (Campbell, “Agency: Promiscuous and 
Protean” 3). In other words, I view materiality and subjectivity as playing equal roles in 
the constitution and constraint of agency. In this conceptualization, while an individual is 
subjectified to exist and understand the world in a certain way, his/her material practices 
have the equal capacity to effectively shape our social realities, and thus subjectivity. We 
are, in short, both the subjects and the authors o f our histories.
The physical body and practices o f the subject, then, are constrained by 
ideological processes of subjectification, but as the individual performs his/her 
subjectivity new resources become available for future articulations, thus influencing the 
larger cultural discourse. Though subjects do not exist in a history o f their own making, 
their material practices are inventive in the sense that they create material effects that 
allow for new possibilities for future meaning-making activities. This is how I approach 
the problem of agency and invention. Greene discusses the rhetorical canon o f invention 
as it “points to how different rhetorical practices make visible a host o f behaviors and 
populations” (31) that make social change possible. Consideration o f body modification 
as material practice can thus be considered inventive as it exists within networks o f 
effectivity. As each practice engenders a multiplicity of effects, body modification can be
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envisioned as a rhetorical instance— rather than a “situation”—that negotiates, constructs, 
and disseminates meanings that have the potential to alter future realities.
Thesis Organization
The following represents the organization and preliminary table o f contents for 
this project.
Chapter 2
This chapter argues that the body discursively is constrained by a cultural 
commitment to interiority. Interiority describes the rhetorical scene o f self-hood. It refers 
to a set o f culturally shared beliefs about the authentic inner-self: one’s soul, stable being, 
or “true identity.” It specifies, in other words, an essential belief in one’s authentic inner 
being, whether spiritual, romantic, or social. Leading the discussion of how people 
articulate practices o f body modification based on assumptions about interiority will be a 
discussion of the movie Modify. This is an award winning documentary about varying 
practices o f body modification ranging from the socially acceptable to the socially 
extreme. The directors o f this movie travel the country asking these modifiers “why?” 
This film provides, in the modifiers’ own words, subjective answers, illuminating that 
many of the practices in this film rely heavily on the assumption that human bodies are a 
physical manifestation o f some sort o f essential inner-being.
Chapter 3
The third chapter argues that the body is believed to relate directly to social 
acceptability as a result o f the assumptions in chapter two. This chapter discusses an 
understanding of the body as it is used as a vehicle o f socialization and acceptance in the
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ongoing quest for a rhetorically constructed ideal o f beauty, success, and worldly 
happiness. Organizing this discussion will be the personal narrative of Cindy Jackson, the 
woman who has set the world record for having had the most plastic surgeries of anyone 
in the world. After undergoing a reconstruction of her entire form, Jackson moved on to 
write books about her choices, practices, and experiences. Revealed in her memoirs is a 
desire to be socially accepted and valued. Her subjective desires and motivations to 
change her physical form are fueled by an ideology that holds and values the human body 
in a certain way. However, because o f her extreme “commitment” to achieving the goal 
o f social acceptance, she has inadvertently set herself apart from what is viewed as 
socially acceptable, though her body mirrors her interpretation of the ideal female form. 
Chapter 4
The fourth chapter argues that the assumptions outlined in chapters three and four 
can be used to manipulate the body for political effect. This chapter follows attempts of 
individuals who manipulate their physical condition as the expression of their political 
beliefs and desires. Leading this analysis is an examination of Morgan Spurlock’s award- 
winning documentary “Super-Size Me.” In this text, Spurlock transforms his once 
healthy, trim body into a spectacle o f obesity in order to provoke political and social 
reform. His conscious intent in this film is to exhibit his body as a protest to corporate 
fast food culture and to make a statement on the epidemic of obesity. After only 30 days, 
Spurlock had completed his “experiment” and had the materials, including the image of 
his grotesquely changed physical being, to make his statement. However, in this time, he 
had also caused irreversible damage to his body. Because of his intent, however, his
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practice is not framed as self-mutilation, but instead a noble quest with social utility in 
mind.
Chapter 5
This final section summarizes and synthesizes the conclusions found in each 
individual chapter. Additionally, this chapter addresses the contributions this project 
makes to the rhetorical investigation o f the body and bodily practices. I detail the 
usefulness o f the assumptions outlined in these chapters, as well as make 
recommendations for their reconsideration.
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Notes
' The American Society o f  P lastic Surgeons. Accessed on 13 August 2006 www.plasticsurgerv.org
 ^“Intent” is an inherently problematic term in rhetorical studies, and is used here to the extent that we have 
an awareness o f  our own choices and actions. A further discussion o f  ideology and agency as it is 
understood in the scope o f  this project is featured in the methodology portion o f  this paper.
Discipline and Punish, The History ofSexuality, and Power/Knowledge are just a few works o f  Michel 
Foucault that discuss the body in relation to power.
 ^Adaptations o f  a number o f  these questions appear in the Rationale portion o f  this chapter.
 ^ 1 explain M cGee’s fragmentation thesis in the methodology section o f  this chapter.
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NO BODY KNOWS THE REAL ME:
INTERIORIZING THE BODY 
I approach the topic o f body modification with the assumption that all body 
projects have the potential to be rich with both individual and social meaning. However, 
because o f the nature o f this potential, I argue that body modification projects have no 
inherent significance, and only become meaningful as they occur in specific personal and 
cultural contexts. 1 will demonstrate that body modification projects exist on several 
levels of rhetoricity (personal, social, cultural, etc.), making the body a site o f conflict 
and struggle over intended and perceived meaning. There is no fixed denotative meaning 
to any act o f body modification; rather, the way in which these practices are understood 
to function both on an individual and on a social level depends on specific contexts that 
are comprised of personal feelings, individual experiences, and fundamental cultural 
assumptions about the self and the body.
In this chapter 1 focus on different ways in which people consciously manipulate 
their bodies in order to express a sense of internal “selfhood.” Throughout the course of 
this chapter, I will illuminate the ways in which bodies are rhetorically constructed 
through an assumption about the fundamental link between notions o f the inner and outer 
self. The aim of this chapter is two-fold: First, I will examine how the human body has
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been culturally upheld as a publication device used to transmit feelings of internal 
selfhood and essential identity. In so doing, I will illustrate how cultural understandings 
o f the body are rhetorically produced and reproduced and, in turn, contextualize human 
bodies and limit their signification. In order to accomplish this, I will combine several 
“texts” to be observed and analyzed. First, 1 will include the testimony of body modifiers 
as they are presented in Modify, a 2005 documentary that follows various practices o f 
body modification. Additional statements were collected via e-mail exchanges with 
several individuals discussing the desires and intentions behind their modification 
practices. The voices o f these modifiers provide a vivid depiction of the role that 
assumptions about the inner-self and identity play in these practices. In so doing, I hope 
to illustrate the general cultural tendency to link body modification to feelings of “true 
selfliood,” and provide a nuanced way to understand body modification projects. 
Ultimately, 1 will argue that practices of body modification must be disarticulated from 
their dominant meanings in order to “free up” their potential to be meaningful and 
productive in new ways. The goal here is not to make moral judgments about these 
practices, but rather to de-essentialize the significations of body projects. The unveiling 
o f the body and its modification as rhetorical productions contributes to the overarching 
argument of this project that such practices can become rhetorically inventive only when 
their underlying cultural assumptions are exposed and re-evaluated.
Who am I? Questions o f the Authentic Self and the Bodv
As the human body is commonly understood to be a site and vehicle of personal 
expression, it has become natural to link the physical form with “interior” feelings of
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subjective being. “I didn’t feel like everyone else,” a young man who goes by “Johnny 
Angry Johnny” explained via e-mail, “So I began to find ways to change the way I 
looked and make it visually apparent that I wasn’t the same as everyone else. Now I feel 
more like myself than I ever did before.” ' “Johnny Angry Johnny” is only one body 
modifier, but his words are indicative of a cultural epidemic. Millions o f people today 
have expressed a similar interest in communicating a sense of self to the world through 
their bodies. Because of the cultural tendency to link the exterior to the interior, body 
modification projects are often understood to be the physical expression and/or 
representation of one’s “true” subjectivity or “core” self. This perspective assumes that 
selfness exists prior to corporeality. This notion not only influences how body texts are 
read within the social, but also encourages personal body projects that perpetuate a 
cultural understanding of the body as such. The meanings attached to practices o f body 
modification are culturally bound by fundamental assumptions and presuppositions 
regarding the corporeal form and notions of the “authentic self.” Until these assumptions 
have been acknowledged, evaluated, and ultimately, deconstructed, the intended and 
potential significations of body modification projects are discursively limited by these 
cultural “knowledges.” Once these “truths” are acknowledged as cultural fictions, and the 
extent to which bodies are rhetorically produced is fully realized, the practices that 
consciously aim to alter the physical form can be freed to take on individual, unique, and 
truly inventive meaning.
As explained by Drema Albin, “whether inscribed, pushed through, or bound, our 
skins are used as textual boundaries that are reacted to by viewers” (Albin 20). Personally 
and socially, body projects are treated as textual expressions or representations of
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subjectivity. The methods through which we physically “express” our subjectivity, 
however, are shaped by both internal and external forces. According to Albin, 
“modifications of the body appear to incorporate at an individual level internal processes 
and choices influenced by cultural representations” (20). The body as a dynamic text, 
then, is subject to (mis)interpretation, contestation, and negotiation as it exists within a 
larger rhetorical environment. As I will argue, the intentions o f personal body projects are 
fueled by both visible and invisible cultural forces that both shape and constrain the 
potential significations of body modification practices.
According to Russ Castronovo, the American public is fixated on the immaterial. 
In his book Necro Citizenship: Death, Eroticism, and the Public Sphere in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States, Castronovo argues that the nation’s preoccupation 
with issues of the soul and interiority distract the public from the material conditions of 
social and political existence, casting our gaze “inward” to constitute ideal models of 
citizenship and democracy. “Interiority” in this sense is the rhetorical scene of self-hood. 
It refers to a set of culturally shared beliefs about the authentic inner-self: one’s soul, 
stable being, or “true identity.” It specifies, in other words, an essential belief in one’s 
authentic inner being, whether spiritual, romantic, or social. It is thought to be composed 
o f “feelings, fantasy, desire, and affect” that can only be “reached through the mediation 
o f language and representation” {Early American Literature pp. 1-2). Interiority, then, is 
only accessible to others as it is featured in our strategic use o f language and other 
symbols.
Castronovo’s general claim is that the American public understands “who we 
essentially are” to be completely separate from our historically produced bodies, as well
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as the historical conditions that surround us. In his discussion o f occult rhetoric, 
Castronovo demonstrates the hegemonic functions that physical bodies can have in 
perpetuating a model o f citizenship that is pristine, passive, and unconflicted. It is 
through an articulation with the body and “soul” that historically untouched bodies 
function in this manner, presenting the unmarked and ahistorical body as the optimal 
model. Castronovo argues that the “little girl” was the ideal model of citizenship in the 
1830’s because her body had not yet been marred by her surrounding materiality, thus 
privileging the immaterial over the material and presenting an unobtainable model as 
ideal. This same privileging can be seen in contemporary society, as Berlant argues that 
the “little girl” is central in structuring “adult culture.” She claims that “legitimate US 
citizenship” is structured around the “psychological and political vulnerability” (“Live 
Sex Acts” 279) that the little girl figure is said to represent. This, in turn, results in the 
fixation on the figurative little girl’s “morals, mind, acts, body, and identity” (Berlant 
286) in the structuring o f social and political logics. The use of immaterial bodies as a 
model, however, is problematic because bodies are “historical rather than biological or 
purely physical” (McKerrow, “Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric” 3 18). Human bodies 
inevitably are shaped and marked by material conditions, such as natural wear and tear 
throughout time, physical labor, race, gender, and illness.
However, although citizenship, or what Castronovo would call the cultural fiction 
of legitimate citizenship, privileges issues o f the “soul” over the body, it has become a 
common association in society to understand the two to be inextricably linked. Though 
the “soul” is understood to have priority over, and even independence from the physical 
body, the human form has come to be understood as a medium through which the
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intangible “authentic se lf’ can become socially accessible. This can be seen in the 
express intentions o f body modifiers. For example, Steve Haworth, recognized as the 
father o f 3D body art, states: “Some people want to express their soul to the world around 
them. One of the ways they can do that is body modification.” Haworth, a certified tattoo 
artist who is practiced in the “art” o f subdermal implementation, makes this assessment 
based on his interaction with several clients a day that seek his expertise.^ Haworth 
clearly subscribes to the notion that the body and the soul are directly linked to one 
another. Further, because o f the common understanding of body modification as an 
expression o f “selfness” amongst his clientele, he recognizes this claim as a justifiable 
and reasonable motivation to participate in such acts. Because o f the tendency to assume 
an automatic relationship between the body and the soul, the American public has 
become obsessed with issues o f the body as the physical manifestation of selfhood. The 
material becomes an echo of the immaterial, the physical becomes a pathway to the 
metaphysical, and hence the body matters to the extent it relates to the soul.
Magrit Shildrick argues that the question that plagues the Western imagination is 
that of “Who am 1?” She claims the conventional answer to that question refers to a sense 
of self that assumes “a transcendent detachment from the material business of the world, 
or at least an effective, and indeed affective, autonomy within it” (79). The American 
fantasy is one of transcendent autonomy over the physical self, fueling the need to feel 
unique and individual within and ultimately through our bodies. This fantasy is what 
drives the American public to articulate acts of body modification with expressions of 
individuality. Though we consider ourselves to be unique and distinct from the “mere”
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materiality o f the world, we desire to be recognized as individuals and for the flesh 
boundaries o f our “core” self to reflect our affective understanding of who we are.
The performance and pursuit o f this American fantasy are clearly demonstrated in 
the documentary film, Modify. The film hosts interviews with people who participate in a 
wide variety o f body modification practices, ranging from the conventional to those 
normatively considered to be “extreme.” In this film, the directors o f Modify, Greg 
Jacobson and Jason Gary, travel the country and ask these modifiers, simply, “why?” 
Why do they participate in such practices? What are their aims? This film provides the 
modifiers’ own words in response to these questions. One respondent, a tattoo artist 
named “Bear,” proudly answers the question o f “why” with; “Everyone modifies their 
body in one form or another to help show on the outside how they feel on the inside.”
The subjects in this film thus largely confirm the cultural tendency to project feelings of 
interiority onto their physical bodies. This film illuminates the point that many of the 
body modification practices featured rely heavily on the assumption that human bodies 
are a physical manifestation or representation o f some sort of inner-being. The 
significations o f these acts, then, are limited insofar as they are presumed to be directly 
related to issues o f the “soul” or essential self.
Shildrick further argues that “selfhood” can be addressed in one o f two ways. 
First, the corporeal form can be “bracketed out, as though it were of no concern” (78). In 
this line o f thought, the body and the mind bear no necessary relation to one another, and 
the self exists solely in the immaterial realm. This perspective clearly privileges feelings 
o f interiority, as worldliness does not seem to bear any significance in the becoming of 
subjectivity. This worldview seems to maintain that “who we are” has nothing to do with
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either our material conditions or our physical bodies. We exist prior to our experiences, 
outside of history.
The other approach sees subjectivity as being “inseparable from material being- 
in-the-world” (78). This point o f view envisions subjectivity as being comprised o f both 
body and soul, allowing the material to bear some level of importance in the composition 
o f selfhood. This perspective, however, still assigns the material a secondary role in the 
construction and shaping o f the self. Shildrick argues that “to be a self is above all to be 
distinguished from the other, to be ordered and discrete, secure within the well-defined 
boundaries of the body rather than actually being the body” (79). This common 
understanding of selthood as it relates to the body implies that there is an autonomous 
inner being that is enclosed and protected from the material world by the corporeal from. 
Clearly, though the body is thought of as being cooperative with the core “essence” o f the 
self, it continues to be considered as an instrument of the self, rather than a constituent 
part.
Because it posits a mind/body dualism, this conceptualization envisions the “se lf’ 
and the body as separate entities. However, though it is often considered that the interior, 
“true” self exists on a separate plane of existence from our material bodies, the common 
assumption is that the two bear an important relationship to one another. This widespread 
belief understands the human body to function as a buffer between the interiorized self 
and the material world, assuming a dialectic relationship between corporeality and 
interiority. This assumption is problematic because it presumes that all body modification 
projects are inextricably linked with issues o f selfhood and identity. This, however, is 
clearly not the case. Jen Davis, a professional tattoo artist, demonstrates this point. After
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adorning her body with six tattoos and dedicating her life to the profession, she proclaims 
that she is done with tattooing simply because, as she states in the film, “it hurts.”
Further, she argues that the incessant question o f what her tattoos means is vexing 
because “it doesn’t even always have to mean anything. It doesn’t always have to have 
meaning behind i t ... sometimes people just think something is pretty.” Clearly, though 
Davis holds this viewpoint, the continual querying into the significance o f her body art by 
spectators illustrates a pervasive assumption about the potential meanings o f body 
modification practices.
Now that we have discussed the fundamental assumptions surrounding issues of 
the body and the soul and how they are presumed to relate to one another, we can move 
on to investigate how this assumption fuels practices o f body modification as projects of 
selfhood.
Bodv Modification as Projects o f the “Core” Self
The same practice o f body modification can be articulated in any number o f ways 
that assume a connection between the essential inner-being and corporeality. According 
to Pitts, “human bodies are always shaped and transformed through cultural practices” 
and “body modifications have been interpreted as challenges to the naturalized status of 
Western body norms, and as forms of self-fashioning and self-narration in postmodern 
culture” {In the Flesh 23). For example, in the movie Modify. Jesse Jarrell argues that 
his choice to participate in new and innovative body modification practices started with 
his discontentment with the human body. He argues that the human form is unsatisfactory 
and seems as if  it is “not finished.” His response was to be the creator o f a new form of
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body modification. Jarrell is recognized as the inventor of the first “soft” subdermal 
implants, and wears rows o f them over each of his biceps.
Other forms o f body modification practices can be linked to “unconventional 
sexuality and gender” (Pitts 24). For example, one of the prominent body modifiers 
featured in Modify is Las Vegas’ Frank Marino, the leading act at the Riviera’s “An 
Evening at La Cage.” Marino is a transvestite and has been working for over 20 years as 
a Joan Rivers impersonator. Marino admits that he has undergone several plastic surgery 
operations to make himself look younger and more feminine. His drive to alter his 
physical appearance is rooted in his understanding of how the self relates to the body, as 
well as his knowledge o f social roles and gender conventions. However, though a display 
o f unconventionalized gender and identity, his actions are actually subscribing to 
normative understandings o f beauty and gender. His self-identification as a woman has 
driven him to alter his physical form to mimic his perceived interiority.
Paul Sweetman discusses permanent body modification techniques as an attempt 
to fix and anchor the “self.” Sweetman’s research indicated that individuals tend to use 
body projects to demonstrate a strong “commitment to oneself’ (“Anchoring the 
(Postmodern) Self?” 53). Sweetman claims to see an abundant tendency for individuals to 
conceptualize their practices as “an attempt to lend corporeal solidarity to expressions of 
individuality” (53), further linking these practices with interiority. For example, Zulu, a 
professional body piercer, discusses the importance of his work and his own personal 
modifications in Modify. Zulu states: “I wouldn’t feel complete. 1 wouldn’t even feel like 
me. I wouldn’t feel human if  I didn’t have this tattoo on my face.” Zulu’s statement 
illustrates an intense perceived connection between his “true” inner-identity and his faeial
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tattooing. Further, he feels that his identity was fragmented and partial until his 
modifications perceivably completed him.
Belief in an “inner-essence” combined with a desire to be socially identified with 
that essence results in the individual’s strategic manipulation of verbal and visual 
symbols to transmit that wholly private experience to the public. Interiority can be 
thought o f as being concealed exclusively in the private realm because notions of the 
“inner-self’ are conceptualized as intangible to others and as “unique” to the individual.
A subject’s understanding of his/her true identity, then, is best described as what Albin 
calls a “translinguistic movement that is experienced” (23) and has “preverbal elements 
that accompany affect, and thus need expression” (22). In other words, interiority is 
experienced and, thus, requires modes other than the spoken word to make that 
experience tangible. One must use several discursive and non-discursive forms to 
transmit this intangible “movement.” This movement is best understood through Debra 
Hawhee’s discussion of “how bodies and language come together” (“Language as 
Sensuous Action” 333). According to Hawhee, often overlooked is the fact that physical 
gesture as communication precedes the spoken word. More, her assessment o f Sir 
Richard Paget’s gesture-speech theory encourages a worldview that “turns on its head the 
relatively recent commonplace o f ‘the body as discursive formation,’ offering instead 
discourse as bodily formation” (332). As previously discussed, interiority is assumed to 
exist in a state prior to the formation o f language. If Hawhee’s approach is accepted, then 
it is assumed that all linguistic forms o f expression are accompanied by some originating 
form of bodily gesture, and that some expressions may be made without any verbal 
expression at all. If  this is the case, a linguistic mode of expression is necessarily
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accompanied by a physical mode of expression in the communication o f an affective 
state. Cultural practices that articulate the body with interiority, then, utilize several 
modes o f “self-expression” to communicate a unique sense of self to others.
These methods of self-expression can be understood as a publication of interiority 
that rely on an individual’s conscious behaviors and/or manipulation o f linguistic and 
visual symbols. The proposal that these behaviors are “conscious” and intended plays an 
important role in the material publication o f interiority. The claim of conscious intent is 
inherently problematic, since who we are and how we behave is the product external and 
internal conditions frequently not o f our own making, and that many o f these conditions 
are not or cannot be known to the subject. For example, some theorizations on how “the 
self” is constructed and shaped posit that “invisible forces such as unconscious desire” 
(Pitts 28) play an important role in the creation and maintenance o f the self. In this mind 
set, individuals cannot have complete control over the shaping o f their subjectivity, and 
thus do not have power over who they essentially “are.” This approach renders subjects 
“zombies,” as Joshua Gunn and Shaun Treat would put it, that are oriented as social 
subjects by ideology that “animates bodies and robs them of agency” (“Zombie Trouble”
160). The formation o f their being is out o f their hands, and the complexity o f the self is 
beyond the grasp of the human consciousness. However, the social expression of who 
one truly thinks he or she “is” requires a conscious understanding o f an inner-essence and 
the desire to actively represent that self through verbal and visual symbols and through 
material practice. A publication of interiority, whether through visual or verbal 
representation (or both), requires 1 ) intention/desire to bring the “interior” to the
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“exterior”, 2) an understanding o f an interior state, and 3) the understanding and use of 
various symbol systems.
It is important to remember that our realities are mediated through symbols, signs 
and codes. Whether or not one believes an objective, unmediated reality actually exists, 
an individual’s access to it is virtually impossible. There is a natural propensity to forget 
or ignore the great extent to which our personal and social realities are constructed and 
understood through symbol use. Kenneth Burke argues that “though man is typically the 
symbol-using animal, he clings to a kind o f naive verbal realism that refuses to realize the 
full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality [.vie]” (Language as 
Symbolic Action 5). Further, he posits that humans can only experience a “tiny sliver of 
reality” and the rest of what we know is “a construct o f our symbol systems” (5). French 
psychoanalyst .lacques Lacan would agree, as his theory o f psychic structure posits that 
“The Real” is the world as it exists prior to mediation by language, the ego, and the other. 
Lacan claims that though “The Real” exists, we cannot fully grasp or engage it because of 
our reliance on symbols and mediated forms. If this is taken to be true, then both our 
understandings of ourselves and our material surroundings are rhetorically produced, 
maintained, and modified. How we understand our realities is filtered through a rhetorical 
lens that is mediated by language, context, and culture. The things we understand to be 
“true” are rhetorical effects, and that which we consider to be “real” is always mediated 
by discourse and culture. Albin concurs as he states that “a view o f reality may in fact be 
a based on ideology that is mediated by media and culture [s/c]” (22). The urge to express 
ourselves through our bodies, then, is a product of how the body is prefigured 
discursively and culturally. In turn, the ways in which our bodies are used to express
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ourselves (the methods o f interior publication) are determined by (and limited by) our 
understanding of the uses and functions o f our physical form. Finally, textual readings of 
other bodies occur within a context— a rhetorical environment that is at once restrictive 
and ever-changing.
Clearly, the cultural assumptions that link the body to a transcendent self help to 
shape the ways in which we understand the human body and how it should function. This 
premise leads to acts o f body modification that are understood to function as publication 
devices that transmit subjective feelings o f selfhood so that they are accessible to others. 
Nikki Sullivan agrees when she argues that the body is “one that ‘does T or performs its 
identity in and through relations with others, and that both marks and is marked— ad 
infinitum— in and through these affective dramatizations of (inter)subjectivity and 
(inter)textuality” (Tattooed Bodies 8). She explains that the body is a “map” that 
reproduces interiority, but also performs connections and disconnections with other 
textual bodies. This understanding, however, places the body in limbo— a wavering zone 
of private publicity, or public privacy. The body, in this sense, is a buffer, a boundary, 
more specifically, a bridge between the realms of privacy and publicity, immaterial and 
material. It is thought of as fully belonging to neither realm, but as existing in relation to 
both.
As previously mentioned, visions o f the transcendent inner-self contribute to 
theories that subscribe to a mind/body dualism that privilege the mind (soul) over the 
body. In this view, the “se lf’ exists separate from, or more precisely prior to, its physical 
form, and issues o f the mind are viewed to be superior to issues o f the body. Rhetorical 
theorist Raymie McKerrow notes that people assume their subjectivity exists prior to
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their corporeality; he posits further that this is a “misrecognition” and that people have a 
tendency of “forgetting or repressing their own corporeal genealogies and processes of 
production” (318). However, because of the social value placed on issues of the soul, the 
“se lf’ must act upon the body to exhibit its essence to others. Anxiety over 
misrepresenting interiority fuels body modification practices that assume a connection 
between the body and interiority. For example, when asked why he began participating in 
modification acts such as body piercing, tattooing, scarification, and branding, one 
individual responded; “I wanted something that showed who I was and that I’ve never 
seen anybody have.”  ^This statement reveals this young man’s drive to demonstrate his 
feelings of interiority and independence through body modification practices. His 
understanding o f his “true” identity is that it exists separate from and prior to his material 
being, and thus his acts of body modification bridge his affective feelings of subjectivity 
with the material world. Without these actions, he assumes that his true essence will be 
lost and remain undetected.
Clearly, the corporeal form is positioned as a site for “establishing identity that is 
read by the self and others” and as “an ever-emerging, unfinished materiality that gains 
meaning through various forms o f symbolie representation and material practice” (Pitts, 
In the Flesh 29). The body, then, is treated as an ongoing project of “becoming.” The 
subject continually manipulates and transforms his/her physical shape as an attempt to 
stylistically construct, maintain, or alter a perceived but fragmented and fluid identity.
For example, a body modifier may get a tattoo as a “rite of passage” ritual, indicating to 
that individual a self that is autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient. Though rites of 
passage are, by definition, social practices, they are culturally ingrained as symbolically
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transformative rituals indicating some fundamental growth or progression of the 
individual’s internal self. For example, in the United States, one must be 18 years of age 
in order legally to obtain a tattoo or piercing without a parent or a guardian’s consent.
This age is socially (and legally) understood to be a marker from adolescence to 
adulthood. Once an individual reaches this age, he or she enjoys the many privileges and 
also becomes susceptible to the many responsibilities of what the government considers 
to be an autonomous and legitimate citizen. This is the age at which a young adult may 
vote, sign up for the military, buy pornographic materials, buy diet pills, participate in 
psychological and sociological experiments, and sign the educated consent for required 
for most to obtain a tattoo, piercing, brand, etc. Many youths engage in these spectacular 
forms of body modification in order to physically signify a point o f transformation and 
independence in their own self narratives. This physical transformation of the body 
alludes to an immaterial transformation o f the individual’s inner-self. The modifier, 
society, and the state recognize this transition into adulthood as a transformation of 
maturity, independence, and awareness. These feelings o f autonomy are transposed to the 
act o f modification, thus charging the body with symbolic meaning. It is in this way that 
body modification can be viewed as symbolic action.
A more socially “extreme” case of an individual modifying their physical form to 
agree with an abstract feeling o f interiority is the story o f a man who goes by the name of 
“Stalking Cat.” Dennis Avner, or Stalking Cat, has undergone extensive tattooing and 
other body modification practices to alter his physical form to resemble that of a tiger. In 
a testimonial given in the movie Modify he states: “The modifications that I’m doing are 
part of a very old Huron tradition, and it’s getting me closer to where 1 want to be and
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
getting me closer to my totem.” Stalking Cat has completely changed his physical body 
to project what he feels is an essential part o f his Native American spirituality. Though it 
may be hard at first to equate the total body transformation of Avner with the practices of 
partial body modifiers, it must be acknowledged that the same underlying principle of 
interiority applies. In Avner’s case, he feels he is a man who is making an affective 
feeling “real” through his material transformation. He feels strong ties with his Huron 
heritage, and even stronger ties with his totem animal. His practices of modification are 
attempts at making inner feelings o f identification, dedication, and selfness both express 
and substantially real to himself and others.
Though Stalking Cat is a unique case, a more common form of whole body 
modification that is articulated with an inner, intangible notion o f self can also be seen in 
the practices of transsexual or transgendered subjects. An individual o f the male sex who 
self-identifies with the female gender undergoes several cosmetic and reconstructive 
surgeries in order to have “his” physical form mirror that of the socially accepted 
depiction o f the female sex. He (she) undergoes this physical transformation to seek a 
balance between his (her) understanding of their inner-self and the socialized self that 
another “reads.” The previously mentioned Frank Marino has not undergone the 
extensive sexual reassignment surgery, but has gone great lengths to “feminize” himself. 
Though he was bom with the anatomy o f the male sex, he identifies with the female 
gender, and has since taken action to reflect this internal self-identification physically, as 
well as behaviorally. In this view, the essential self is viewed as existing prior to the 
physical body, which is used as an apparatus to be manipulated and utilized to represent 
inner feelings o f identity, desire, or affectivity.
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Intentions of such practices assume that body modification is either a reflection of 
who an individual genuinely “is,” or a bridging of the gap between materiality and 
spirituality. Experts in mental health scrutinize this impulse, degrading physical 
expression in the face o f “higher” levels o f self-expression. One psychologist states; “If 
you have to resort to using your body to express things, you haven’t got much to draw 
on” (as cited in Pitts, “Body Modification, Self-Mutilation, and Agency” 299). From this 
perspective, the body is seen as a poor substitute for “true self-hood.” The material is 
regarded as second-rate and inconsequential to one’s “true being.” Either way, the 
express subjective desires o f many body modifiers and their critics refer back to 
attachments to an authentic inner-self, and continue to make material practices of body 
modification subservient to the immaterial qualities o f the self.
It is this notion that makes the practices of transgendered subjects and subjects 
such as “Stalking Cat” fundamentally the same. Although I do not discount the clear 
differences between cases such as Avner and Marino, the point that I am trying to make 
here is that the two practices have more in common than the normative logic would be 
able to admit. Both cases are examples of the impulse to bring that which is interior to the 
exterior. Both change the shape o f their material being to bring balance between their 
corporeality and their feelings o f inner subjectivity. Most importantly, both assume that 
verbal declaration o f identity falls short of the communicative effects rendered by a 
physical declaration o f selfness. It is as Albin states: “The subject knows but does not 
know who he is for he cannot see this on his body” (31). These subjects are thus 
compelled to make physical otherwise immaterial feelings of selfness and affectivity. 
Body modification as such is a project o f the self that aims to bring the interior to the
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exterior. Without the social presupposition that the shape and state o f the physical body is 
somehow related to the quality and condition o f the mental or spiritual self, individuals 
would not feel compelled to make such material proclamations o f selfness.
Clearly, body projects are personally and socially thought of as projects of the 
“self.” The fundamental assumption that is responsible for the routine articulation of the 
body to interiority fuels practices o f body modification that attempt to bridge or seek 
balance between a notion o f “selfness” and a physical being in the world. As body 
modification projects are thought of as practices that attempt to bring the interior state of 
an individual into tangible existence, these projects must be considered as they materially 
occur within a cultural context.
Modification or Mutilation? The Rhetorical Categorization of Bodv Projects
It cannot be denied that social power relations favor certain forms of modification 
while others are inevitably marginalized. Although some practices o f body modification 
that were previously considered “extreme” have been conventionalized and adopted by 
the mainstream society, many o f these practices have been stigmatized and are often 
interpreted as forms of “self-mutilation.” In the mental health use of the term, self- 
mutilation describes “a corporeal expression of a suffering self’ (Pitts, In the Flesh 25). 
In other words, practices o f body modification that are not normatively accepted are 
rejected as signs o f mental illness or self-destruction. Because o f assumptions linking 
corporeality with interiority, the practice o f voluntarily inflicting pain on one’s self for 
whatever articulated reason is normatively understood to be an expression of disturbed 
human depth— a crying out (conscious or not) o f a suffering or disabled inner-self. It is
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
based on this assumption that acts o f body modification are tantamount to self-mutilation, 
and that modified bodies are understood as an expression o f "an imperfect, out o f control 
and suffering self which might need to be treated” (Pitts, “Body Modification, Self- 
Mutilation and Agency” 295). Nikki Sullivan agrees as she argues that body marking is 
generally read as a message of harm that reveals the essence o f the individual self.
The concept of self-mutilation, then, relies heavily on the articulation o f the 
corporeal form to a separate but connected essential self. Without an understanding o f the 
body that links the corporeal with immaterial subjectivity, the cultural category o f “self- 
mutilation” would not exist. Further, it must be acknowledged that practices that 
constitute “self-mutilation” in one worldview can also be articulated as an expression of 
autonomy, identification, or spirituality in another. Pitts argues that “body modifiers’ 
knowledge about body modification is not only affective, but expresses new, alternative 
and recirculated attitudes toward technology, pleasure, sexuality, cultural membership, 
gender, spirituality, aesthetics, and beauty” (293). For instance, certain practices of 
mortification are criticized and understood by some as indications o f pathological 
disorders, while these same acts are embraced and understood to serve productive secular 
or spiritual purposes by others. Mortification of the flesh is understood religiously to be 
reminiscent o f the suffering of Jesus, and is used by some religious subcultures to 
strengthen faith or to overcome weakness. For example, members o f Opus Dei— an 
organization within the Roman Catholic Church dedicated to the “universal call to 
holiness” or, in other words, the belief that everyone should aspire to be a saint— partake 
in what they term “corporeal mortification” which consists of acts such as self-denial or 
self-flagellation to attest their spiritual devotion. Opus Dei founder Josemaria Escriva
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writes: “What has been lost through the flesh, the flesh should pay back: be generous in 
your penance.”'^  Members of this organization are encouraged to engage in various forms 
of corporeal mortification to self-punish and cleans themselves o f daily sins. These self- 
inflicted acts of punishment serve as a reminder o f the suffering o f Jesus and 
symbolically act as a  rededication of body and soul to Christ. Though these acts can 
permanently scar or “disfigure” the practitioner’s body, because o f the meanings attached 
to these actions, they are thought o f as being not only acceptable, but necessary within 
the subculture. The same practice that would be (and is) considered to be “self­
destructive” in one context has spiritual meaning in another.
Another example is the use of mortification in sadomasochistic contexts. 
Participants in the BDSM (Bondage Discipline Sadomasochism) subculture engage in 
practices o f mortification in both sexual and non-sexual contexts to signify a subcultural 
identity, to configure and represent power dynamics, and to enhance experiences of 
sexuality, desire, pleasure (as pain), and pain (as pleasure). As 1 have just demonstrated, 
body modification acts that are normatively stigmatized as “self-mutilation” in 
mainstream culture can be embraced and utilized by subcultural groups to serve different 
purposes, provide distinctive pleasures, and thus assume new meanings. These 
subcultural rearticulations, however, continue to assume that the physical manipulations 
of the body are external indications o f a privileged internal self. Both religious and 
secular acts o f mortification have been pathologized (made deviant and marginal) by the 
mainstream culture, thus deeming certain material practices o f interiority unacceptable 
and even dangerous according by normative standards.
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Pitts concurs as she states “body modifiers are depicted as more 
psychopathological than other groups” (In the Flesh 25). According to Pitts, the social 
framing of body modification as self-mutilation “makes the prospect of agency dubious 
or theoretically impossible” (“Body Modification, Self-Mutilation, and Agency” 296). 
She argues that discourses equating body modification with mental illness have socially 
problematized such practices and inevitably deny its subjects agency. This mind set holds 
that attempts to fashion the physical form are not the choice o f the individual, but rather 
“a desire, addiction, need, or urge” (296), suggesting that body modifiers are not agents, 
but, instead, victims. Body modifiers themselves attempt to complicate this account, 
arguing that body modification is a state of complete agency. For example, women body 
modifiers claim that their practices “redefine beauty” and are acts o f reclaiming their 
bodies from patriarchal culture. The Suicide Girls, for example, are a subculture of 
alternatively styled soft-core pornographers who base their entire existence on this 
platform. Their mission statement is “to change your idea about what makes women 
beautiful,” thus challenging normative attitudes and values.^ Flowever, because o f the 
methods used by the Suicide Girls to express beauty and selfness, their interests are 
necessarily trumped by heteronormative culture. For example, traditional feminists 
discredit the overlying message that the Suicide Girls claim to stand behind, arguing that 
the women participating in the website are reaffirming normative power dynamics that 
marginalize and objectify women. Pitts agrees as she states; “unofficial or marginalized 
knowledges like these are already less likely to be ‘read’ in public discourse as 
discernible or legitimate positions” (“Body Modification, Self-Mutilation, and Agency”
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299). Clearly, context, desire, manner o f publication, and effect play central roles in the 
rhetorical categorization of corporeal practices.
Because o f how body modification practices are culturally understood to 
function— as a rhetorical transmission device that makes visible an individual’s most 
private pleasures, desires, and interests— the human body can only be understood through 
a grid of intertextuality and intersubjectivity. According to Albin, no text exists alone, 
and text can only be understood within a given cultural context and historical placement. 
Albin continues: "Body modifications must be understood in the broader context of 
culture in addition to individual meanings” (Albin 24). Though a useful claim, this 
perspective suggests that cultural context and the individual meanings that people give to 
their practices are separate entities. Although eultural and individual meanings are not 
neeessarily eongruent, it is inevitable that the personal meanings and interpretations of 
texts will be influenced in one way or another by the material and historical conditions 
surrounding both the reader and the text itself. It is just as McKerrow states: “bodies are 
trapped inside cultures, and exhibit those acts promoted within the culture” (319).
Bodies as texts, then, exist only in relation to other bodies (as texts). These bodies 
are upheld and understood socially through a fluid network of power relations that favors 
certain manners of production, maintenance, and manipulation. Because of their 
intertextual nature, bodies and their modifieation necessarily exist within a cultural 
context that understands what a body is and how it should function. The cultural context 
in which we live upholds the body as a device through which our internal identity is able 
to become socially recognized, “creating a culture o f individuals wearing their psyches 
on their skin” (Albin 26). Clearly, then, because o f how our culture understands the body
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in relation to the self, modifications made to the body are socially read as personal 
expressions o f one’s inner-being, even if  this is not the express intent of the modifier 
him/herself. Because of this, subjects are encouraged to supplement their verbal 
expressions o f identity with physical representations o f affective feelings and 
experiences. However, because there is no structured, agreed upon way societies may 
read the body, the social reading of these corporeal texts rely on both personal and 
culturally constituted associations and judgments. Relying on their own subjective 
feelings and experiences, individuals read other bodies in the same way they understand 
their own, as well as through the same ideological lens discursively constructed by their 
cultural environment. This necessarily results in the possibility of multiple readings and 
interpretations o f the same practice of body modification. Albin agrees as he argues that 
practices o f body modification carry several levels o f meaning that “blur across the 
boundaries both imposed by the self and society, resulting in distorted conveyance of 
meanings” (27). However, though distorted, these readings continue to be conditioned in 
powerful ways by our commitment to an authentic self, as well as the understood 
articulation o f this notion to our physical existence. We want our physical bodies to be 
individual and unique and the modifications of our bodies to be meaningful and 
inventive, but until we can nuance and demystify the assumptions outlined in this 
chapter, the potentiality of such practices will be limited.
Conclusions
Not all body modification projects are created equal. I do not deny that there is 
much dissimilarity amongst different methods o f body modification and the extent to
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which individuals participate in them. However, the same underlying assumptions and 
goals fuel practices o f body modification, as well as fostering the social reading of them. 
Because o f the assumptions linking acts of body modification to interiority, many 
practices that should not be associated are likened to one another, while other 
fundamentally similar practices are dissociated. On one hand, two different bodies 
adorned with tattoos for very different reasons should not be read in the same way. One 
instance may be an intended expression o f a perceived “core” self, while the other may be 
a thoughtless result o f peer pressure. Though the practice of tattooing is the same, the 
meanings are not. On the other hand, such as in the case o f Avner and Marino, two 
completely different sets o f practices—whole body tattooing and surgical alteration to 
liken the body to the form of a tiger, and a series o f plastic surgeries, make-up, costumes, 
and wigs to liken the male form to that o f a female— serve the same fundamental 
pui-pose. The practices are substantially different, but the driving force is the same need 
to seek congruency between self-identification and physical form. The main claim 1 am 
forwarding here, then, is that practices o f body modification bear no necessary relation to 
a codified set of meanings. The understanding of the body as ongoing project of selfhood 
must be recognized as a cultural practice that is produced by and in turn reproduces its 
own materiality. In this perspective, social categories, such as body modification, self- 
mutilation, and self-maintenance, are rhetorical designations. These designations enable 
certain readings o f cultural practices, while thwarting others. In other words, by assuming 
a priori that acts of body modification are indefinitely linked to a “core” self or “true” 
identity, we are limiting the potential meanings o f these practices. In order to provide a 
nuanced way of understanding the intended, perceived, and effectual significations of
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body projects, we must first disarticulate the body from the privileges o f interiority, and 
sever the assumed relation between meaning and practice.
The presupposed connection between the corporeal form and the intangible and 
internal self is ideologically reaffirmed through our cultural practices. Body modification 
projects can either be explicitly used by individuals to express who they “are” or are 
socially read as expressions of selfhood. Both cases automatically consider the human 
body a tool used by the authentic self to project its essence, thus reaffirming the cultural 
assumptions that there is an essential self, and that it necessarily acts itself out onto and 
through the body. Both the methods we use and the articulations we make between 
various practices o f body modification and our ideas about the authentic self are made 
possible by previous articulations and understandings o f both the body and the self. The 
inclination to relate body modification to the self, as well as the tendency to consciously 
and intentionally manipulate the physical form to communicate our perceptions o f our 
self and identity are products o f the rhetorical environments in which we live. The social 
understanding and acceptance o f body projects is determined by how each instance is 
rhetorically framed both by the individual and by its surrounding culture.
Clearly, though our cultural knowledge fosters the interpretation that the 
corporeal form reflects the state o f our internal self, this understanding brings forth 
several complicated and widely debated issues o f the methods, intentions, perceptions, 
relativity, context, and effects o f body modification projects. Such body projects exist on 
several levels of rhetoricity. The first level is a transparent one. The self-exercising 
cultural assumption that links the body to interiority is often considered to be mere fact. 
Many do not question this relationship because it is thought to be a cultural truth. But
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where did this articulation come from? Even amidst cultural arguments of religion, 
spirituality, and the soul, most cling to a belief that somewhere, deep inside our bodies, 
lies the real us. Whether or not we believe this entity to be our soul, our spirit, or our 
mind, we are attached to the idea that the answer to the “Who am 1?” question lies deep 
within, but separate from, our physical bodies. This attachment to an autonomous self, 
however, does not keep us from assuming that the body is (or should be) a physical 
manifestation o f our “core” selves. As a direct result of this assumption, subjects 
consciously manipulate their bodies to reflect this sense o f  “inner depth.” Because 
matters o f interiority are expressly private, as the ways we understand and experience our 
“essential se lf’ belong only to our cognitive and affective states, the expression o f this 
perceived internal state requires a strategic crafting and displaying of both linguistic and 
non-linguistic symbols. In other words, the publication of interiority is the rhetorical 
process o f making a wholly private individual public. Material practices used to transmit 
an affective understanding o f selfhood makes accessible to others a previously concealed 
personal experience of selfness.
Because individuals are conditioned to treat their bodies as ongoing projeets of 
interior subjectivity, the body is disregarded as a fragmented material mass that is used to 
commemorate a personal narrative, capitalize aspects o f perceived identity, and 
ultimately used to express who someone “is.” This approach views the body “as a 
garment, a veil or mask, as something which should be changed and modified to become 
congruent with the changes in the se lf’ (Featherstone 10). The fact that our bodies are 
needed to sustain life, and are, at the very least, vehicles through which we are able to 
actually have subjective experience is generally disregarded. The mere conception of
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interiority suggests that materiality has no, or at least very little, bearing on issues o f the 
self and identity. It is vital that we stop assuming that our bodily form is an automatic 
screening of our interior conditions. Though all o f the aforementioned acts can be 
construed as acts of “publicity,” as all are intended or are read as making subjective 
feelings of interiority available to be socially read and interpreted, if we recognize that 
action and meaning share no inevitable connection, the assumed relation between the 
body and the self melts away. The notion o f interiority automatically privileges the 
immaterial, while assigning the human body a secondary role in the formation of the self. 
Once we stop likening our bodies to surface indicators of a deeper and more “real” 
subjectivity the body may be freed up to function in more inventive ways.
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Notes
' The statements provided in this chapter, as well as in subsequent chapters, are the result o f  informal 
correspondence via e-mail with several individuals who consider themselves to be “body modifiers.” These 
individuals range from the socially “moderate” to the socially “extreme” in the manners in which they 
consciously choose to alter their bodies. There were no lists o f  questions prompting their responses, but 
rather, 1 let the modifiers guide the conversation, discussing matters that they felt were central to their 
choices to modify their bodies. These conversations took place over several months between the dates o f  
August 30, 2006 and February 23, 2007.
‘ According to BMEZine.com, subdermal implementation is the insertion o f  three-dimensional objects 
under the skin. An implant is “any object implanted fully under the skin for the purpose o f  affecting a 
sculptural change o f  the surface.”
As cited on the Opus Dei Awareness website at www.odan.org/corDoreal modification.htm  
 ^ As cited on the SuicideGirls website at www.suicidegirls.com
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CHAPTER THREE
MODIFYING SOCIETY: INTERIORITY 
AND CORPOREAL SOCIALITY 
On February 17, 2007, America’s pop music princess Britney Spears did the 
unthinkable: She shaved her head bald and got two new tattoos on her once idolized 
physique. These acts o f body modification attracted the attention of broadcast and print 
media, with reporters and fans immediately condemning her acts and speculating on the 
reasons why she chose to change her look. While a few fans think the new look is a 
provocative statement or hold the view that Britney Spears can do with her body what she 
pleases, most speculate on her recent modifications as indications of an identity crisis, a 
nervous breakdown, drug addiction, and/or mental illness. For example, one ABC 
headline reads “Shaving off Her Hair and Tattooing Her Body May Be Spears’ Way of 
Finding A Fresh Start,” ' while an article from CNN.com postulates that Britney’s recent 
actions may be due to postpartum depression.^ This recent occurrence illustrates how 
body modification is perceived in normative society. While some modifications, such as 
the numerous hair extensions Spears has sported over the years, are welcomed and even 
encouraged in the popular realm, others are rejected and/or scandalized in the critical eye 
o f normative. Whether she shaved her head out o f protest to standardized gender norms, 
as the result of a mental breakdown, or merely out o f sheer boredom and attention
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seeking behavior, Britney Spears physically acted upon her body and the action is now 
being “read” and reacted to by millions. The “event” is being reported by credible news 
authorities and treated as legitimate headline news, and for one resounding reason: The 
general populace is fascinated.
A similar headline in current news is the story of a former Playboy Playmate’s 
untimely demise. Anna Nicole Smith died suddenly at the age o f 39 on February 8, 2007. 
Though the former Playmate is no stranger to obsessive news coverage, recent media 
attention has been paying close attention to the testing and treatment o f her dead body. 
Rewind back to 1991 and we will recall that Anna Nicole’s original claim to fame was 
her live body gracing the cover of the March issue o f Playboy. Sixteen years later the 
public is still obsessing over her body. The media frenzy surrounding Britney Spears’ 
recent body modifications and the posthumous treatment o f Anna Nicole’s body are 
prime cases o f normatively idolized bodies gone spectacularly wrong. Both are prominent 
examples o f our cultural infatuation with bodies, the cultural pressures to normalize 
bodies, and the social reaction to perceptively “un-natural” bodies. Further, the ways in 
which the public reads these bodies and gives them meaning continue to rely on the 
habitual articulation o f bodies with an internal sense o f self.
In chapter two 1 examined the body as a publication device used to transmit 
feelings of interiority. This chapter focuses on the body as it is used as a socialization 
device in the se lfs  idealized quest for acceptance, desirability, normalcy, and perfection. 
Organized by the routine articulation of the body with interiority, use of the human form 
as a medium of social commerce is based on the assumed relationship of an individual’s 
physical appearance and his or her character, competence, and social worth. These
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fundamental assumptions are joined by rhetorically constructed and upheld cultural ideals 
o f physicality, sexuality, and selfness to create a culture driven by fantasies o f corporeal 
sociability, or the body as a locus of social value.
Throughout the course o f this chapter, 1 will investigate body modification 
projects that are enacted in order to fulfill goals of sociality. In so doing, 1 will illuminate 
how the assumptions bolstering the cultural understanding and use of the body as a social 
bartering tool are a rhetorical outgrowth o f the underlying assumptions articulated in 
chapter one. First, 1 will examine the cultural ideals that organize, foster, and maintain 
social networks and power relations, and thus, the role of the self as it exists within a 
particular cultural context. Then, 1 will illustrate how these contextualized ideals prompt 
a sense of corporeality that strives to attain social adherence and acceptance. In other 
words, how these rhetorically constructed fantasies frame the body as social capital. In 
order to accomplish this, 1 combine observation and analysis o f several practices and 
narratives o f body modifiers. Organizing the discussion are the personal narratives o f 
public figures, such as “extreme makeover” cases Cindy Jackson and Miles Kendall, as 
reported in interviews and memoirs outlining the choices, practices, and experiences that 
have made them into the bodies they are today.
Jackson has set the record for having the most plastic surgeries o f anyone in the 
world in her quest to attain her ideal Barbie-like form. Following Jackson’s lead, Kendall 
is recognized as the first male to undergo an “extreme makeover” through plastic surgery. 
These highly visible cases are supplemented with statements collected via personal e- 
mail exchanges with several body modifiers expressing the desires and intentions behind 
their practices. Together, the voices included in this analysis indicate a cultural economy
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where the human body as a commodity that transmits social value and can be 
manipulated to achieve desired social aims. As a collective, their statements demonstrate 
the cultural assumptions about corporeal sociality discussed in this chapter, as well as 
illustrate the central role the body has assumed in the carrying out o f social hierarchies.
In short, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate how inherent in Western ideology is 
a rhetorical vision o f corporeality that links body projects that aim to establish and 
communicate a sense o f identity, create identification with others, conform to group 
standards, and indicate a sense of self and social worth. My aim, as in chapter one, is to 
deconstruct and demystify this vision of corporeal sociability. In no longer assuming an 
automatic relationship between a specific kind of corporeality and social worth, human 
bodies as they exist in culture can be thought o f differently in regards to social currency. 
Instead of presupposing a necessary relationship between the body and social value, this 
approach extricates the body and the modification thereof from dominant social 
meanings, thus expanding the conceptual framework through which we understand such 
practices. This disarticulation will allow for a de-essentialized vision of body projects, 
thus untethering practices o f body modification from their presumed meanings. In so 
doing, this chapter contributes to the overlying thesis o f this project that the Western 
conceptualization o f human bodies is a rhetorical construction that encloses and restricts 
the potential meanings o f body modification projects. This revision works instead toward 
an understanding of human bodies and modification projects that realizes their full 
rhetorical potential.
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Interiority and Sociality: The Corporeal Socialization of the Self
Beginning in early childhood, the national culture industry rhetorically creates 
and reinforces the standards by which we judge the human form. These standards and 
expectations are then constantly reinforced as we, our bodies, are socialized. For 
example, psychological metaresearch emphasizes the importance society plays on the 
categorical construction o f what is deemed “attractive” or not. As Urdy and Eckland 
point out: “Folklore tells us that beautiful girls marry handsome princes and live happily 
ever after. Heroes are handsome and villains are ugly” (“Benefits o f Being Attractive” 
47). The ever-popular children’s fairytale Cinderella tells a story of a young woman who 
is persecuted by her evil step-mother and step-sisters. Though Cinderella is repeatedly 
victimized and taken advantage o f by her family, she continues to have a pure, kind, and 
loving nature. Cinderella is also a young, thin, Caucasian girl with soft features and big 
eyes. Her evil step-mother and sisters, however, are not. They all have twisted, pointy 
features and narrow eyes to indicate their inner malevolence. The lesson here is obvious: 
popular representations link certain modes of physicality with happiness and success 
based on the assumption that physical nature is indicative of internal nature.
The use of the human body as a socialization device is a rhetorical outgrowth of 
the underlying cultural assumptions that assume a direct relationship between the body 
and the soul. As discussed previously. Western society conceptualizes the body as a 
publication device that acts as a buffer between the essential, intangible self and the 
material world. Because o f this presupposition, bodies are socially read as markers of
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interiority, thus charging the physical form with meaning only insofar as it relates to 
issues of the self. This cultural understanding o f the body as a publication device 
encourages the individual to intentionally act upon his or her own physical form in ways 
that seek a socially desired projection o f the self.
This rhetorical performance o f selfness, however, does not occur in a vacuum.
The perceived need to materialize feelings o f “selfness” depends on the presupposition 
that our bodies will be socially scrutinized as such. Further, we assume that there are 
material social rewards or repercussions for having certain types of physicality. This 
brings to light a new set of assumptions regarding the body as it is presumed to function 
in Western society. Because o f their rhetorical nature, bodies are necessarily “read” 
intertextually relative to other bodies. But somewhere along the way. Western culture has 
come to value certain sizes, shapes, colors, and forms of bodies over others, bringing 
issues o f normativity and power to the forefront. The material effectivity of this social 
valuing of certain modes of physicality has created a hierarchy of bodies in our society, 
resulting in cultural mandates that order and categorize bodies.
The social categorizing o f bodies is not a new phenomenon. Bodies have 
historically been used as markers o f difference, resulting in the social reading and 
evaluating o f difference through physicality. However, when reading bodies as texts, 
individuals “come to a system of discourse with an ideological grid already in place and 
participate in terms o f that grid’s determinative nature” (McKerrow 102). In other words, 
the social reading of bodies is filtered through an ideology that has a hierarchy o f social 
values rhetorically built into it. This inevitably leads to the ordering and ranking of the 
texts (bodies) according to this hierarchy, causing certain texts (bodies) to be viewed as
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having more innate “worth” than others. For example, the ideology o f the Nazi party 
fostered a rhetorical environment in the Third Reich that marginalized certain individuals 
with “Jewish bodies,” classifying individuals that had certain “Jewish features” to be of 
inferior character and social worth. According to Jeffrey Herf, “the Jewish body implied 
a Jewish character associated with cowardice, sexual rapacity, crime, murderous attacks 
on women and children, economic exploitation, communist and capitalism, lack of 
patriotism and subversion o f the nation” (“Ideologies in Comparative Perspective” 4). To 
those who identified with the Nazi ideology, the Jewish body signified characteristics that 
were contrary to what the Nazis valued. The Jewish body, then, was positioned as “other” 
in relation to the Aryan body which was exalted and said to be emblematic of Nazi 
values. In Western culture, contemporary Neo-Nazis continue to order and rank bodies 
according to this same hierarchy of values contained within the Nazi ideology. This 
social reading, evaluating, and discriminating o f bodies continues to rely on the 
articulation of physical bodies to internal character, envisioning the human form as the 
embodiment o f ideological values. Thus, the social recognition of coiporeality as the 
materialization o f the self is a rhetorical effect that, when coupled with a hierarchy of 
values contained within an ideology, places the body at the center of judgments that 
distinguish between selves that are socially valued and those that are not.
Clearly, the socialization of human bodies is directly influenced by how cultures 
condition individuals to understand how the human form relates to the inner self. Further, 
cultures condition individuals to favor certain modes of eorporeality over others, infusing 
the physical body with presumed social value. That value is transferred in social 
relations, perpetuating the cultural fascination with bodies as well as the myth that our
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soul—our internal worth— is accessible to others via corporeal representation. In the next 
section, the social construction o f the “ideal” body is investigated with the intent of 
further illuminating how bodies are used in Western culture as a tool o f socialization.
This will further demonstrate the reliance o f this process on fundamental assumptions 
regarding the body, the interior self, and social value.
Idealizing Society: Constructing a World o f Corporeal Fantasy
The manner in which we socialize our own bodies and read the bodies o f others is 
contingent on an understanding o f some “ideal” form of corporeality. Western culture 
consistently values certain types o f bodies. Specific characteristics vary according to 
gender, but popular representations o f the human form present certain physical attributes 
regarding skin color, stature, age, size, shape, and symmetry as ideal. But what are the 
Western ideals o f attractiveness and where do they come from? Some perspectives 
maintain that the physical attributes that we consider to be “beautiful” are rooted in our 
primitive instincts. Christine Rosen, for example, argues “there is a deeply human 
intuition about beauty” (“The Democratization of Beauty” 2). This outlook views 
“beauty” as something that is “natural” and exists separate from cultural constructions of 
physical attractiveness. This viewpoint, however, is widely debated. Richmond and 
McCroskey define attractiveness as a “perception” that “does not exist on its own” 
(“Nonverbal Behavior in Interpersonal Relations” 16). Instead, beauty is bound up in our 
personal and social experiences. This definition implies that attractiveness is not an 
inherent trait but rather is culturally constructed, and is dependent on superficial 
attributes. Though this school o f thought is widely supported, differing perspectives have
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been offered up to explain how attractiveness is socially constructed and gauged.
Different scholars forward different arguments, but the more fundamental point is how 
the debate itself reveals the hegemonic status the body holds in social relations.
“To be beautiful in America,” one individual proclaims, “you need to be young, 
thin, and follow the beauty trends forwarded by the mass media.”  ^This individual is one 
of many who, when asked what the ideal body is, indicated that beauty is something to be 
desired, strived for, and, most importantly, requires constant pursuit. “The fight for 
physical perfection is an uphill battle,” another individual explained. “You need to 
constantly be dieting, working out, coloring your hair, moisturizing, tanning— and for 
what? So that someone can still always be younger than you, thinner than you, or have a 
better complexion than you, or something minute like having better eyebrows than you 
do.” When questioned what the “perfect” body looks like, everyone has an answer, and 
largely, the answers gathered bear some resemblance to one another.
Others who describe a physical attraction to something that seemingly does not fit 
the normative model o f ideal attractiveness often qualify their statements o f desire. One 
individual explains: “I’m really strange when it comes to fat. On myself 1 can’t stand it. 
On the girls that 1 date ... well, let’s just say 1 don’t mind heavy girls. It’s weird, 1 know, 
but 1 don’t want my partner to look like me naked.” This young man qualifies his 
attraction to “heavy” girls with the words “strange” and “weird,” acknowledging that the 
model of beauty he values is distinct from normative society’s ideals. He does not feel the 
need, however, to qualify his hate for fat on himself, because he perceives this to be a 
socially acceptable sentiment. Another respondent shows a similar response. When asked 
what the perfect male physique looked like, she replies: “The male models are usually fit
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but not overly muscular, handsome without being overly pretty. 1 guess my idea o f a 
‘perfect’ guy is a little odd in comparison. 1 like guys who are a little chubbier, a little 
more rugged looking.” This respondent also casts her gaze at mainstream representations 
o f male bodies in order to structure her own model o f desire. She qualifies her preference 
with the word “odd,” and consistently compares her standards to what she views as the 
normative preference for male bodies. Clearly, it is not to say that “mainstream” 
standards o f attractiveness necessarily dictate individual desires, as deviations from the 
norm clearly exist, but rather that these desires exist in contrast to and are shaped by the 
normative ideal.
Though it is true that certain groups, specifically spectacular countercultures and 
enclaves, have stylistically “different” ideals o f physicality, they too must cast their gaze 
at normative conceptions o f the body in order to reject them. One organization, for 
instance, the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) may value 
human bodies that are larger than “average,” but there has to be an acknowledged 
“average” for such a position to exist. The mere existence of this group shines light on a 
larger issue— body fat is largely not socially accepted. In fact, the average weight for an 
American female is actually heavier than the “ideal” weight. According to the National 
Center for Health Statistics, the average American woman is 5’4” and weighs 163 
pounds, though the “healthy weight” for this height peaks at 144 pounds/ USA Today 
reports, however, that the average female model is 5’11” and weighs around 120 pounds, 
which would be drastically “underweight” by the United States Department o f Health and 
Human Services’ standards.^ Because o f the idealized status these models are perceived 
to have, however, many women are left feeling that they are drastically heavier and, thus.
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less attractive, than the average female. Without the need to forward “fat acceptance” 
NAAFA would have no purpose. Its mere existence, then, is organized by dominant 
mainstream ideals o f corporeality, and it is precisely in this manner that the body is 
hegemonic in social relations.
Though considered a very prominent issue for women, men do not escape this 
perceived necessity to lose weight. You may be familiar with Jared Fogle, the public face 
o f Subway Restaurants. Fogle “earned” his celebrity for losing 245 pounds on “the 
Subway Diet” and is now a recognized pop culture icon and called a “hero” by some. 
Fogle’s fame, however, is dependent on his shrinking frame. The sole reason for public 
interest in his story is because he “chose” not to continue to be obese. “If people didn’t 
give a damn, I wouldn’t be in the position I’m in,” Fogle said in an interview with CNN.^ 
Fogle’s story drew large media attention because o f his “fight” against fat. Fogle’s 
newfound celebrity status further enforces the assumption that fatness is unacceptable. 
Further, his story tells Americans that the only people to “blame” for fat are ourselves.
An accurate representation of what is considered to be “ideal” in American 
culture can be seen in magazines, on billboards, on television, and at the movies. Images 
o f actresses like Scarlett Johansen and fashion models like Heidi Klum recruit men and 
women alike, informing them with assumptions o f what it means to be beautiful, 
feminine, and sexually desirable. Men and women view bodies in the likeness o f Brad 
Pitt’s and Mark Whalberg’s as ideal representations o f desirability, masculinity, and 
strength. Further, these representations tell the general public that these are gender 
specific qualities that should be strived for. It is through the use o f these bodies and their 
societal prominence that normative gender ideals are perpetuated, thus ensuring the
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hegemonic polarization o f the sexes. These bodies and the ways in which they are 
culturally upheld tell us that women should be docile and men strong, women should be 
beautiful and delicate and men striking and rugged, women to look like sex and men to 
look like industry. Though performative deviations from these dichotomous gender-roles 
exist, they are quickly labeled by the culture industry, qualified as trend, and ultimately 
distanced from the “true” ideal man.
The metrosexual, for example, was supposed to be the new ideal model for 
American men. “Metrosexual” is used to describe a straight man that practices what 
normative society describes as “homosexual” male traits, mainly an interest in fashion 
and physical appearance. By labeling a man who explicitly cares about how he outwardly 
appears to others “metrosexual,” the culture industry automatically distinguishes him 
from the normative American male. Qualifying these traits as stereotypically homosexual 
only further enforces the normative perception that straight male should be indifferent to 
fashion labels and skin products. Finally, after much attention was spent on the “new” 
metrosexual American man, stories like “Metrosexual is out, Macho is in” began to 
circulate in the mass media, proclaiming the “death” o f the metrosexual.^ Though there 
are still men labeled as such by the media and by society, they are no longer thought to 
possess traits true to the normative standards of ideal masculinity.
Human bodies are all around us, and the culture industry tells the American public 
what they should look like. Media representations o f the ideal body tell women that they 
are expected to be forever frozen in their twenties, narrow-hipped, thin but voluptuous, 
have big eyes, with light, clear skin, long flowing hair, no body hair, and should be 
“perfectly” made-up all the time. The perceived ideal shape for men is to be a tall, broad-
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shouldered, twenty-something with a chiseled abdomen, clear skin, and a seemingly 
effortless “I just fell out o f bed looking this good” look. How an individual is 
subjectified, however, determines how he or she will approach, read, and react to a text.
A subject position is “a stance, role, or perspective one takes in relationship to a text so as 
to read or engage the text” (Brummet and Bowers 118). The texts in this case are the 
culture industry’s widely available representations o f the ideal body, as well as the 
material bodies a subject comes into contact with. Depending on how an individual is 
discursively positioned, he/she will engage the text (body) differently. An individual who 
inhabits an identified subject position, for instance, will find “characters, themes or 
images in the text with which he or she identifies, or desires to identify” (118). The 
beauty industry tells identified subjects that they want whiter teeth (but not too white), 
tanned skin (but not too tan), bigger boobs and muscles (but not too big), a flatter 
stomach (free of stretch marks, scars, and cellulite), line-free skin, and on the list goes. 
These somewhat dynamic guidelines are fixed in rhetorically constituted cultural values 
that cherish certain gender specific characteristics such as youth, attractiveness, and 
whiteness, while condemning physical differences. A subversive subject position, 
however, will be “at odds with, and often directly opposed to, the call of the text” (119). 
The texts produced by the culture industry still call to these subjects, but their subject 
positions encourage a different reading and/or reaction that rejects the message 
(normative standards) but still continues to constitute them as subjects. The normative 
guidelines communicated through these texts cause individuals to act upon their bodies to 
either adhere to or explicitly reject cultural mandates. These actions, then, are rhetorical 
effects that are shaped by the normative ideal.
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Assuming that certain physical characteristics are inherently “better” than others, 
individuals are pressured to conform to normative standards o f “normalcy” to be socially 
accepted and even privileged. The cultural desire for “perfection” propels individuals to 
discipline their bodies and to intentionally manipulate their physical features as rhetorical 
symbols o f social status and worth. Cindy Jackson is a prime example of the actions 
taken in order to attain a cultural ideal. Jackson has undergone 46 operations in the past 
16 years to completely transform her physical form. “It was to look better. It was to get a 
different life” she explains in an interview with The Independent^ Her actions 
demonstrate a cultural belief that corporeality is directly linked to lifestyle, and that the 
ideal she pursued would socially benefit her. And she is not wrong: Jackson enjoys a 
lucrative lifestyle o f fame and fortune based solely on the visibility she has gotten for her 
Barbie-like near perfection.
In a CBS News interview Jackson muses over her upbringing: “I wasn’t that good 
looking. And my sister was really, really a pretty girl. She was breathtaking. And 
everyone used to talk to her more and smile at her more and notice her f ir s t .J a c k s o n ’s 
experience is not uncommon. A large body of research in the social sciences has been 
dedicated to the investigation o f the role physical attractiveness plays in social situations. 
According to Debra Gimlin “the body is arguably the location from which all social life 
begins” {Body Work 8). Because o f the intangibility o f the self and the cultural 
assumptions regarding how the body and the self are related, individuals are initially read 
and socialized based on their physical appearances. Research conducted by William 
Goldman and Philip Lewis investigated the “physical attractiveness stereotype” in which 
society tends “to attribute ipso facto to the physically attractive such qualities as
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intelligence, warmth, and capability” (“What is Beautiful is Good” 126). The mere 
presence of this stereotype indicates the cultural trend to articulate physical appearance 
with social worth, and more so, positively correlating such attributes with one another. 
Further, this stereotype demonstrates the assumptions outlined in the first chapter that 
articulate the human form with interiority. Though the study did find that physical 
attractiveness and social skill fulness were significantly correlated, the researchers also 
acknowledged differential socialization as a potential cause of this. This theory assumes 
that children regarded as “attractive” receive positive reactions growing up and, thus, 
become more comfortable in social situations. If this is the case, the cultural ingrained 
inclination to treat the physically “attractive” more favorably is already at work. This is 
the materialization o f rhetorically constructed values.
Research regarding any correlation between the physical appearance o f an 
individual and his/her character or social prowess frequently assess findings as a result of 
how individuals are socialized. Social scientists largely agree that individuals who are 
deemed “physically attractive” time “receive more opportunities for social interaction 
which provides them with a larger social repertoire than unattractive people” (Zakahi and 
Duran 55). Goldman and Lewis agree as they claim that there is evidence that “more- 
physical 1 y-attractive subjects are more generally liked than the more unattractive 
subjects” (129). It is possible that findings such as these can be explained using the “halo 
effect,” meaning that individuals are perceived as being more proficient in certain areas 
“simply because they are attractive” (Zakahi and Duran 56). This trend illustrates a 
cyclical social logic that treats individuals in a certain way because o f the way they 
physically look. This treatment is justified by the presumption o f positive personality
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traits that are generally developed as a result of the nature of their very socialization. 
Clearly, because o f the ways we are socialized, the shape and form o f the human body 
has bearings on matters that fundamentally have no “real” association. Because of this, 
bodies inevitably play a role in unequal power distribution in stratified societies.
The “ideal” body is not a real entity, but a rhetorical construction. Even the 
fashion models depicted in New York’s Times Square have been airbrushed and digitally 
“doctored” to symbolize what the advertiser wishes/desires/perceives to be the “perfect” 
woman or man. To be socially viewed as normatively aceeptable or attractive one must 
constantly engage in “positive” body projects. No matter how hard one works to 
transform their physical form, there is always something that can be tweaked— there is 
always at least one “imperfeetion” an individual can improve upon. A short story by 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, entitled “The Birthmark,” calls such perceived imperfections 
“mark[s] of mortality” (21); an indication of our very humanity. Hawthorne tells the 
story of the insatiable professor Aylmer who becomes obsessed with ridding his almost 
perfectly beautiful wife o f a small birthmark on her cheek. Aylmer cannot enjoy the 
immense beauty o f his wife’s body and soul because he is fixated on perfecting her 
complexion. The birthmark begins to take on deeper meaning to Aylmer as “the symbol 
o f his wife’s liability to sin, sorrow, decay, and death” (12). At one moment within the 
story, Aylmer’s wife, Georgiana, recognizes that Aylmer will not remain satisfied if he is 
to succeed. Hawthorne writes; “Longer than one moment she well knew it could not be; 
for his spirit was ever on the march, ever ascending, and each instant required something 
that was beyond the scope o f the instant before” (21). Georgiana’s recognition o f her 
husband’s never-ending pursuit o f progress, however, does not keep her from risking
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permanent disfigurement or even death because the birthmark becomes all the couple can 
focus on. Death, indeed, is the price the poor woman pays for her bodily perfection.
The stories o f Cindy Jackson and Miles Kendall, though less tragic, demonstrate a 
similar insatiable thirst for bodily perfection. In 2003, Cindy Jackson had spent 
approximately $100,000 on 47 different cosmetic surgery procedures in her quest for 
Barbie-like beauty. In several interviews that year she was quoted as saying that her 
“dreams had finally come true.” '*’ On the contrary, as o f 2006 Jackson’s 47 procedures 
had become 62. Her “dreams” o f feminine perfection have still not been reached. 
Jackson’s male protégé, former website designer Miles Kendall, has had only two 
operations and nine procedures, but has entirely reconstructed the appearance of his face 
over the past six years. Now working in the world o f celebrity, however, Kendall feels 
more pressure than ever to “keep up with [his] appearances.” "The Western ideology o f 
beauty seems to forward an unattainable ideal, but it is more than that. Built into the 
notion of the ideal body is an idea o f product as progress; the ideal body is a never- 
ending process that can never actually be attained by anyone. There is no finished 
product. Culturally, we understand the body as a project that requires constant attention 
and diligence to maintain social acceptability. Inherent in the notion o f the ideal male or 
female body is its modification, which is usually thought of as “improvement.”
Ironically, an unmodified body, then, is socially viewed as unnatural.
Normalcy is clearly framed by representations o f beauty ideals that can be seen in 
the rhetorical artifacts o f popular media. W omen’s magazines especially encourage the 
constant modification o f the female body in order to be viewed as beautiful, desirable, 
and socially accepted. Headlines on the cover o f these magazines scream; “ 10 Steps to
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the Perfect Butt,” “Lose 10 Pounds by Swimsuit Season,” or “Get the Body You’ve 
Always Dreamed Of.” These magazines are setting the Western women’s agenda, 
prompting her to constantly be thinking about ways to improve upon her physicality. One 
individual describes her quest for the ideal female body: “Though 1 know these girls are 
airbrushed and have a team of stylists who work for hours to make them look perfect, I 
still use them as sort of a standard, a way to see how much further I have to go. So until 
Cosmo[politan Magazine] starts showcasing girls who look like me, I’ll continue to hit 
the gym, buy the ‘Lean Cuisines,’ and spend too much o f my paycheck in the cosmetics 
department.” This young woman’s cultural experience indicates that routine daily rituals 
o f bodily discipline are a “natural” part o f female corporeality. The failure to comply 
with society’s expectations, then, would result in a socially abject “unnatural” female 
body.
Thus, innate in the ideal model are the characteristics o ï fragmentation (the body 
is a series o f parts instead of one functional whole) and process (the ideal body is never 
finished). The cultural machine uses this rhetorically constructed ideal to situate 
corporeality at the center o f social transactions. The next section illuminates how the 
assumptions linking physicality and interiority in combination with socially enforced 
standards o f acceptable or desirable physicality result in the attachment o f social value to 
the human body (and its parts).
T he B usiness o f  Bodies: Ideal B odies and Corporeal Socialization
Because o f the Western fixation on physicality and interiority, we are constantly 
aware o f our bodies and the bodies o f others. According to Sharon Crowley, women’s
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social worth is measured “through and by their bodies” forcing women “to become 
highly conscious of their bodies—the space they occupy in a room, on the street, in a 
crowd” (“Afterward” 358). A constant awareness o f our own bodies inadvertently results 
in the awareness and evaluation o f other bodies in comparison to own. Crowley argues 
that women’s bodies are constantly under scrutiny, socially evaluated as to whether or not 
they are virginal, impregnable, or attractive. Yet, while the male gaze is a pressing issue 
for women, men do not escape the social scrutiny of others based on their appearance.
The social stigmatism of fat, for example, is gender blind. Wanting to avoid the harsh 
criticism of others and feeding the need to be socially accepted, men and women alike go 
to the gym, go on crash diets, and even develop eating disorders.
The material social rewards for having the “right” type of body are undeniable. It 
is just as Rosen postulates: “beauty is a valuable commodity” (1). Leora Farber agrees as 
she suggests that “skin holds particular currency for Westernized women and 
(increasingly) men” (“Skin Aesthetics” 247). This can explicitly be seen in the United 
State’s historical struggle with racism. The Jim Crow Laws enacted and enforced in the 
early 1900’s physically separated and socially marked the status and worth o f humans 
based on the color o f their skin. Bodies with black skin were read intertextually with 
other bodies, especially in relation to white bodies, resulting in the social devaluation of 
black skin. Though mandating that facilities and treatment for individuals with dark skin 
be separate-but-equal, the Jim Crow Era marked individuals with an “undesirable” skin 
color with an inferior status. This is a prime example o f hegemonic transference of power 
and social worth based on mere physicality.
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Our bodies are rhetorically charged with cultural value, and our bodies are 
figuratively and literally used in social exchange to transmit a desired good or service.
The language surrounding bodies treats corporeality as commerce, thus indicating the 
presumed intrinsic social value placed on certain forms o f corporeality that can be used in 
social bartering. Certain forms o f corporeality can be used as currency, a sort of 
“bargaining chip” to gain desired social responses and reach particular outcomes in social 
situations. In an interview with CBS news. Miles Kendall explains that his ability to open 
his new bar is due, in large part, to his new looks. Using his body to enhance his business, 
Kendall relies on society’s largely held assumption that outward appearance signals 
social worth. “People call me shallow. But I call society shallow, because they treat me 
differently now.” Cindy Jackson shares a similar sentiment when she states, “there are so 
many people who are being held back by their looks, and if that can give them a better 
quality o f life and make them happier—what else is more important in life?” (“Becoming 
Barbie,” 2). When they were “ordinary” people, Kendall and Jackson strived for a better 
quality o f life and the route to success was mapped out on the body. Jackson’s lifetime 
quest is to look like a Barbie doll to live a “glamorous life.” Kendall embarks on a similar 
quest for Ken doll-like perfection. Both cases demonstrate a cultural assumption that 
successful, self-content people must embody social ideals. Giving new meaning to the 
term “dress for success” the two “extreme makeover” cases assumed that to have success, 
you must first look like it.
Physical attractiveness, then, acts as a social commodity— a social freight that is 
in high demand. On one hand, there is the literal exchange of bodies for money, such as 
in the practices o f human trafficking and in prostitution. Human bodies in these types of
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transactions carry a specific dollar value. In other situations, individuals are socially 
rewarded for physically “fitting-in” or adhering to “mainstream” standards of physicality. 
For instance, some research shows that in cases of workplace sexual harassment, 
attractive victims were more likely to be believed than unattractive victims (Seiter and 
Dunn 2000), while other research shows that attractive defendants in court room 
proceedings received, on average, lower bail or fine amounts than less-attractive 
defendants (Downs and Lyons 1991). Though these societal situations are seemingly 
untouched by issues of corporeality, the size, shape, and form of the human body clearly 
plays a significant role in the organization and distribution of power.
The business o f bodies is made explicit in the industry o f cosmetic surgery. The 
innovation has placed a dollar amount on bodies, as the industry promises the 
transformation o f certain body parts for a set price. The power o f the industry has 
maximized the capacity with which one can attain cultural ideals o f “normalcy” or 
“perfection.” This, however, contributes to the social marking of status on physicality. 
Because it is socially known that “perfect” noses, breasts, foreheads, eyes, waistlines and 
the like can be purchased, there is less social tolerance for the less-than-perfect physique. 
If the “right” type o f body is made increasingly available through cosmetic surgery, 
individuals are held personally responsible for deviations from the norm. Further, if  one 
does not participate in the systematic maintenance and modification of the body to meet 
societal standards, it is socially read as a marker o f inferior socio-economic status or 
mental health. “Imperfect” bodies are largely read as signifiers of laziness, lower 
economic status, depression/mental instability, and/or subversion. For example, the 
stigma o f fat is, to a certain extent, a cultural fiction. With the exception of cases of
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obesity, which can lead to the failure of vital organs and arteries, body fat is not 
intrinsically harmful to the human body and is actually used by the body in useful ways. 
Obese, overweight, and even individuals who do not fall into the “thin” category, 
however, are often critieized for their physique because it is allegedly so easily 
countered. An individual has many practices from which to choose to alter the size of 
his/her body such as diet, exercise, liposuction, or even gastric bypass surgery. The 
failure to participate in any o f the aforementioned practices for whatever reason is thus 
regarded as negligence. The mass production of normative bodies is made possible by 
this industry, further widening the perceived gap between “normative” bodies and 
“marginal” bodies.
Using cosmetic surgery as a springboard, another realm of the culture industry 
that has capitalized on the urgency for “normalized” bodies is reality television. As 
previously discussed, it is not a new phenomenon to equate a change in physical 
appearance with a change o f selfness. Traditional fairytales often center on this theme. 
“Beauty and the Beast,” for example, tells the story of a man who is transformed into a 
beast as retribution for his cruel, greedy, and selfish demeanor. It is only after the Beast 
learns to be kind, generous, and falls in love that he is transformed into a handsome 
nobleman. His change in appearance signifies a change o f heart. With the advent of 
television, this representation has been made more explicit and abundant in contemporary 
society. New television program formats and plotlines extend this articulation. Daytime 
talk shows often offer a makeover to compliment a new outlook on life. Guests who 
come in to talk about low self-esteem, divorces, and discontentment are offered a new 
hairstyle, wardrobe and makeup to aid the transition to a new way of life. For example, a
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current call to “The Ricki Lake Show” on the official website prompts visitors to apply to 
be on the show if they have lost 100 pounds and “need a makeover to show off [their] 
new look. The new physical appearance is meant to signify an internal change, as well as 
be used as a catalyst toward starting a new life. The recent explosion of reality television, 
however, has taken the articulation of bodies, selfness, and lifestyle to a whole new level. 
The television series “Extreme Makeover” is emblematic of this phenomenon. On the 
show, men and women alike undergo entire body transformations with the help of plastic 
surgeons, eye surgeons, cosmetic dentists, hair stylists, and makeup artists. The show is 
framed as providing contestants with “a real life fairy tale in which their wishes come 
true, not just by changing their looks, but their lives and destinies.” '^ The marriage o f 
cosmetic surgery and reality television explicitly makes the connection between physical 
appearance and the lives we live, as well as making numerous procedures visible, and 
thus accessible, to the general public. Following the lead of “Extreme Makeover,” many 
reality television shows center on this theme, including “Dr. 90210,” “Celebrity Look- 
Alikes,” “ 10 Years Younger,” “The Biggest Loser,” and “1 Want a Famous Face.” These 
displays normalize extreme makeovers and assist in removing social stigma from many 
cosmetic surgery procedures.
Cultural trends such as these perpetuate the business of bodies. They provide 
resources necessary for the conceptualization o f the body as a fragmented project o f the 
self that is used both literally and figuratively for the social ordering and advancement of 
the self. The assumptions linking the body to interiority are amplified here, assuming that 
bodies should be indicative o f character and social worth. This causes the social reading 
of bodies as such, perpetuating the cycle. According to Robert Hariman, “status is a
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concomitant o f socializing” and “attributing status is a social act” (“Status, Marginality, 
and Rhetorical Theory” 43). Texts, and therefore bodies as texts, do not have any 
inherent status, but only that which we grant them. Rhetorically constructed ideals of 
bodies encourage Western society to favor one mode of physicality over others, linking 
different forms o f corporeality with different internal states of being and worth. This 
allows for the social stratification o f bodies oriented by a hegemonic hierarchy of power 
that determines what is “normal” or “acceptable” and what is not. This inevitably leads us 
to marginalize certain types of bodies, thus leading to negative social projection and the 
assumption of inferior social worth.
The cultural ideals imposed on “normative bodies” influence and constrict 
“marginal bodies.” The final section deals with the relationship between normativity and 
marginality, and interrogates non-normative body projects as they are used and 
understood in marginal culture.
Normative Ideals and Peripheral Corporealitv
As previously discussed, the normative conception of “ideal” Western bodies has 
the notion of body modification built into it. However, commonplace everyday rituals 
that “normalize” the body are often not consciously thought o f body modification, but 
rather, as personal hygiene, grooming, or self-maintenance. As discussed in the first 
chapter, distinctions between what is considered to be self-maintenance, body 
modification, and self-mutilation are made through social narratives. Body modification 
acts must be considered in regards to their larger cultural context as well as the framing 
of such acts by the communities and individuals that engage in them. Though one group
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may consider an act to be a declaration o f “self ’ and of spirituality, if  normative culture 
does not share this sentiment the act in question is inevitably trivialized as “trend” or 
marginalized as “mutilation.”
This can be seen as happening with highly visible body modification practices 
such as tattooing. Tattooing is becoming increasingly normalized, gaining the visibility 
and endorsement o f popular culture. For instance, former Playboy Playmate Bunny o f the 
Year Pamela Anderson— a popular sex symbol that represents feminine sexuality and 
beauty to many— sports several tattoos. Her participation in the act allows for certain 
types o f tattooing to be viewed as sexy or feminine. Though not considered to be 
emblematic o f the natural, ideal body, moderate tattooing has become widely accepted 
and incorporated into dominant models o f attractiveness and desirability. What society 
deems to be “excessive” tattooing, however, continues to be stigmatized. Eric Sprague, 
better known as “The Lizardman,” has participated in approximately 650 hours of 
tattooing that now cover his entire body, including his scalp and eyelids.'^ This type of 
tattooing continues to be socially rejected, and is read by others as signs o f mental illness 
or instability. To avoid this type of social castigation, individuals are forced take a certain 
level of care in the selection of body modification practices they choose to partake in and 
in the ways in which they frame them. The way practices are understood to function and 
personal motives and significations attached to them, then, exist within and are inevitably 
shaped by this larger rhetorical environment. This environment invariably provides 
resources for body modification projects while limiting their potential meanings.
There are various ways body modification projects are used to socialize the self. 
As previously discussed, many instances o f body modification are used to “normalize”
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the self and to fit into mainstream culture. Cindy Jackson and Miles Kendall, for 
example, may have used methods that are socially deemed to be “extreme” to mold and 
shape their bodies, but their results adhere to social standards o f acceptability and beauty. 
The social results for their actions, then, have been positive, granting both subjects fame 
and fortune based on their physical transformation. Other “extreme” body modifiers, such 
as Stalking Cat, who was discussed in the first chapter, and the Lizardman, have not been 
given the same social reception. Because of the types o f bodies these men have come to 
possess, society has responded by criticizing, marginalizing, and even fearing the two 
subjects. Though Cindy Jackson and Stalking Cat both had an ideal in mind and went to 
great lengths to achieve it, because o f the normalized standards imposed on bodies, the 
end result plays a large role in the social acceptance o f the process o f transformation. The 
process, however, is empirically equivalent.
Though not culturally considered as “normative bodies,” individuals who use 
their bodies to socialize within marginal society continue to do so based on the 
fundamental assumptions called on by “mainstream” culture. Countercultures and 
spectacular subcultures, though aiming for different forms o f corporeality, still 
understand the body to be functioning both as a publication device o f the essential “se lf’ 
and as a socialization device, relating that “se lf’ to the “other.” Marginal body 
modification projects, then, continue to function in the same way as normative body 
projects. Because the body is culturally assumed to be directly related to the intangible, 
essential self, the potential signification o f body projects is constrained to the nature of 
this self and how that is socially valued. This encourages body modification projects that
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aim to establish and communicate a sense o f identity, create identification with others, 
conform to group standards, and indicate a desired sense of self and social worth.
Different practices o f body modification, however, can mean very different 
things. Tattooing, for example, can serve any number o f personal or social purposes. For 
instance, a particular symbol etched into the skin can signal membership into a 
spectacular subculture. A “skinhead” may get a swastika tattoo and shave his/her head to 
be initiated into that group. He or she could also be receiving that same tattoo to create 
identification with others who view participate and adhere to the neo-Nazi ideology as a 
fundamental part o f his/her inner-being. He or she could also be conforming to group 
standards, altering his or her physieal appearance to suit the norm of the social group. All 
o f these practices, however, are carried out based on the assumption that the body is used 
as a socialization tool o f the self. All are intended to signal some notion o f self, whether it 
be an embodied identity or merely gesturing at the identification with an ideology, thus 
linking character to physical presence. Whether or not modes o f physical adornment have 
pronounced social intent, the intentional changing o f one’s physical form to correspond 
with a system of beliefs or and induction into a subculture signals a perceived notion of 
selfhood. Though the act o f modification may serve solely social purposes at a conscious 
level, the need to physically signal an adherence to a given ideology is driven by the 
same assumption that links the interior o f one’s being to their physical form. The acts of 
modification in both o f these cases are using the body as a tool to make internal feelings 
o f self and identity tangible and subject to be read and interpreted by others. These 
modifications are an attempt by the individual to describe him/herself as a specific type 
o f person. Through use o f the body, a modifier can make an internal notion o f self both
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external and palpable in order to be recognized and understood in a manner that is 
congruent to an affective identity. An individual can just as easily verbally express to 
another person that he or she is a skinhead, but the physical act of modification 
personally and socially codifies that identification, as well as allowing the individual and 
those “reading” his or her body to visualize an otherwise immaterial feeling of 
transformation and/or identity.
Conclusions
As soon as an individual begins to understand the body to function in a certain 
way, he or she reads bodies according to a set o f assumptions, as well as in relation to 
other bodies, creating an intertextual rhetorical environment within which our bodies 
circulate. Our understandings o f selfness, o f corporeality, and o f sociality, and how the 
three relate to one another are contingent on this environment and the underlying 
ideological assumptions it generates. Providing the resources for interpretation and 
meaning-making activités, these self-exercising assumptions have a hegemonic function, 
constraining and limiting our perceptions o f “reality.” The “realities” o f bodies, then, 
depend on the interplay o f rhetoric, hierarchy, and power creating certain societal 
guidelines through which we “read” and favor certain modes o f physicality and methods 
of production, maintenance, and manipulation o f the human form.
Only when we recognize the extent to which our bodies are rhetorically 
constrained can we begin to envision the body and its modification to function in 
different ways. The first chapter illuminated how Western culture has been conditioned to 
understand the body to act as a publication device. Based on this articulation, society has
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corne to charge the body with social significance that allows for certain bodies to be 
privileged over others. As American ideology is built on certain fundamental themes that 
decidedly determine what is culturally honored and valued, bodies that seemingly 
materialize these themes are charged with higher social worth. The material transference 
o f this presumed worth only perpetuates this myth, resulting in a social consciousness of 
human bodies.
This consciousness o f the body inadvertently pressures individuals to either strive 
to meet societal standards o f physicality, or to consciously reject them. Rejection of these 
standards, however, is performed in such a fashion that continues to meet the cultural 
expectation corporeal socialization. In other words, the situating of the body at the center 
o f sociality is a rhetorical effect that can be seen both in the mainstream and on the 
margins o f contemporary society. Once the body is disarticulated from the “soul,” the 
socialization of the human body will be at once complicated and simplified. In not 
assuming an automatic relationship between selfness and corporeality, the rhetorical 
charging o f certain modes o f physicality will be problematized. This will allow for the 
body and its modification to be understood in new inventive ways.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICAL SELVES, POLITICAL BODIES:
MODIFIYING THE BODY POLITIC 
The second chapter o f this project examined cultural assumptions that promote an 
understanding o f the body as a publication device o f the self. Chapter three extended this 
analysis in its illustration o f how the assumed relationship between the body and the 
interior self fosters a rhetorical vision o f corporeality that understands the body as a 
socialization device. These chapters, then, deal with the human body as a site of the 
struggle over personal and social meaning. This chapter, by extension, deals with the 
body as a site o f political struggle and signification. Because o f the assumptions dealt 
with previously, bodies have become thoroughly politicized. The use of the physieal body 
as a locus for political action and signification is largely intertwined with the human 
form’s assumed relationship with selfness, subjectivity, sociality, and citizenship. 
Throughout the course o f this chapter, I will demonstrate the ways in which these 
associations lend political agency to the body while simultaneously restricting the body’s 
signifying potential.
Although bodies are commonly integrated into larger rhetorical strategies to 
accomplish political aims, this chapter focuses on body projects that consciously alter the 
human form with the express intent of modifying a surrounding environment. In other 
words, I will investigate acts of modification that envision the body as instrumental in
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accomplishing political aims. In so doing, I will demonstrate the ways in which the 
presumed relation between the external self, the essential self, and the social self lend 
meaning to the body as a political device. Further, I will illuminate how bodily practices 
that are framed or read as seeking political goals gain cultural urgency from the 
assumptions outlined in the first two chapters, thus reaffirming a cultural belief in the 
politicized body.
In short, the aim o f this chapter is to interrogate the intentions and perceptions of 
“political” practices o f body modification with the goal of illustrating the reliance of 
these practices on a rhetorically constructed vision o f corporeality. Thus, this chapter 
contributes to the overarching thesis of this project that the Western conceptualization of 
human bodies is a rhetorical construction that encloses and restricts the potential 
meanings o f body modification projects. My aim, then, is to demystify the vision of 
political bodies in order to open up new avenues for the consideration of a personally, 
socially, and politically meaningful corpus. Leading this analysis is Morgan Spurlock’s 
rhetorical use o f fatness in his award-winning documentary Super-Size Me in order to 
make a social and political statement against fast food corporations and the growing 
epidemic o f obesity. Through the unique framing o f voluntary fatness, Spurlock uses his 
body as a springboard to make an argument against fast food culture. He combines the 
social stigma o f fatness with a politically framed body project to stimulate cultural 
anxieties about bodies, selves, and health in order to use his body to modify his 
environment. The analysis o f this documentary will be combined with discussion and 
analysis o f other instances o f explicitly “political” body modification—specifically the 
hunger strikes o f student activists and the self-immolation of anti-war protesters. These
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practices will be juxtaposed with similar acts o f body modification that are not 
individually or socially framed as signaling political commitments or interests. This 
comparison will assist my previous claims regarding the rhetorical construction of 
categories o f body projects, as well as the social valuing of particular types o f bodies in 
relation to the self and other bodies.
Ultimately, this chapter acts as a culmination of the previous two. 1 intend to 
further demonstrate the aforementioned assumptions at work within political body 
projects, while using this category o f body modification to demonstrate their usefulness. 
Finally, I will demonstrate how the successfulness o f such body projects depends on the 
individual’s ability to use the cultural assumptions outlined in chapters two and three of 
this project while simultaneously disarticulating them.
Political Bodv Projects: Modifying the Self. Modifying the Environment
The use of the body as a resource for political action is not a new concept. 
Precisely because of the assumptions diseussed in earlier chapters, in one way or another, 
human bodies have long been at the center o f political struggle. For example, raced 
bodies and sexed bodies were used as primary resources for the marginalization of certain 
citizens, thus limiting their capacity to participate in public deliberation and the politieal 
process. The women’s suffrage movement, for example, was formed to extend the right 
to vote to women who had historically been left out o f public deliberation and the 
political process. This political marginalization occurred largely at the site of the body, as 
the female sexed body presumably marked a politically incompetent or inept citizen. For 
example, before the Women’s Rights Movement, women were largely kept out of politics
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by physically not allowing them to participate in politieal activity. One instanee o f this 
occurred in 1840, when Lucretia Coffin Mott was not allowed to participate in the World 
Anti-Slavery Convention in London because o f her sex. She was physically kept out of 
the convention, and her exelusion ultimately sparked the organization o f the first 
women’s rights eonvention (Wood, Gendered Lives). Her female anatomy somehow 
signified her political competency (or lack thereof) resulting in her formal exclusion from 
participation. The same types o f confliets can be seen historically in America’s social and 
political race struggles. Before the abolition o f slavery, raced bodies were legally 
reeognized to be indieators o f inferior beings, marking certain bodies as property and 
others as citizens. Even after abolition, raced bodies struggled for political rights and 
social status. These struggles continue today.
Human bodies are also used both as a hegemonic rhetorical tool to perpetuate 
gender norms and expeetations and as a subversive rhetorieal tool to refute them. For 
example, stereotypical senses of femininity typically physical and are thus carried out on 
the body. Because o f this, some feminists choose to consciously de-feminize the sexed 
body to make a “statement” against eonventional conceptions o f womanhood and beaiity. 
A famous example o f women refusing to conform to beauty standards was at the 1968 
Miss Ameriea pageant. In a demonstration against the pageant, women protested “by 
throwing false eyelashes, bras, and girdles into what they called the Freedom Trash Can” 
(Wood 64). This demonstration was enacted to give voice to women by rejecting “the 
view of women as sex objects” (Wood 65). This political and social protest was clearly 
focused on issues o f the normative feminine body.
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Bodies have also been positioned at the center o f policy building, as is the case 
with attempts to legislate and regulate human bodies in regards to issues such as slavery, 
prostitution, reproduetion/abortion, and suicide. The legal battle o f the practice of 
abortion is a prime example of this. Even since the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court case Roe v. 
Wade legalized abortion in all 50 states, pro-life and pro-choice activists clash over the 
issue of pregnant bodies and unborn bodies. Pro-life activists desire legislation to be 
passed to regulate pregnant bodies, arguing that the unborn bodies inside constitute living 
beings. Pro-choice activists use the slogan “My Body, My Choice” to refuse the legal 
regulation o f pregnant and unborn bodies. Many o f the debates focus on the issue of 
“when life begins,” centering on the interior issues o f selfness and the spirit. Women 
have similarly struggled over reproductive rights and the right to birth control. Margaret 
Sanger, one o f the most visible advocates for “voluntary motherhood,” insisted that “a 
woman’s body belongs to herself alone. It is her body. It does not belong to the Church. It 
does not belong to the United States o f America or any other government on the face of 
the earth . . . .  Enforced motherhood is the most complete denial o f a woman’s right to 
life and liberty” (as cited in Wood 62). Clearly, central to the issue at hand is the 
governance o f the female body.
Another example of the state’s attempt to legislate bodies is the continuing debate 
over the topic o f assisted suicide. The highly publicized 12-year court battle over the life 
and death (and body) of Terri Sehiavo is a key instanee o f this. Michael Schiavo, Terri’s 
husband, asserted that his wife had no desire to live in a vegetative state. The Florida 
woman’s family, however, fought to keep her alive. Despite the passing of the case 
through the Florida court system and the rulings o f nine judges on the matter over the
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years, on March 21, 2005 congress passed a bill which was immediately signed into law 
“that could trigger a federal court review and a quick restoration o f feeding tubes needed 
to keep the brain-injured Florida woman alive.” ' The federal courts, however, turned 
down the motion, and the patient died just over a week later. This is but one example of 
legislation that has been introduced to attempt to regulate the body and outlaw suicide 
and euthanasia. The same issues o f ownership and governance apply.
Bodies have also been used in social movements to attract attention, create 
physical barricades, and to signify opposing ideologies. Kevin Michael DeLuca, for 
example, describes the body rhetoric o f activist groups such as “Earth First!,” “Act Up,” 
and “Queer Nation.” He maintains that such groups rely on the dissemination of images 
o f “vulnerable bodies, dangerous bodies, taboo bodies, ludicrous bodies, transfigured 
bodies” to constitute “a nascent body rhetoric that deploys bodies as a pivotal resource 
for the crucial practice o f public argumentation” (“Unruly Arguments” 10). Such activist 
groups, he argues, use their bodies as both “flags to attract attention for the argument” 
and as “the site and substance of the argument itse lf’ (10). The Human Shield movement 
uses bodies in a similar fashion. In January o f 2003, hundreds o f “Western anti-war 
activists” traveled to Iraq to act as human shields “to try and stop the rush to war.”  ^ The 
action assumed that the presence o f socially valued Western (mostly white) bodies would 
act as a physical deterrent for the invasion of Iraq and the bombing and killing of 
(presumably) less valuable bodies. Clearly, then, the body functions as both a locus of 
political contestation and a useful resource for political argumentation. This chapter, 
however, focuses on spectacular body modification projects that are used to influence or 
modify a surrounding environment.
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Body projects have thus far been discussed as projects of the self carried out to 
reach personal and social goals. As illustrated in chapter two, because o f the articulation 
o f selves and corporeality, bodies are located at the center of social relations and have 
been culturally situated as a form o f currency valued by the self and other. If human 
bodies are the material gateways to inner subjectivity— indications o f our inner quality, 
character, and social worth—then it is an easy move to claim that bodies should be 
preserved, maintained, and thought o f as our most prized possessions. Actions that are 
read as intentionally trying to harm this cherished entity or as detracting from its 
perceived value, then, automatically gain public concern and even legislative attention.
The consequence is twofold. First, because of the sheer amount o f attention paid 
to bodies and the manner in which Western society revels in its idealized form, 
individuals are compelled to use the body to reach personal, social, and political aims. 
Without the presumed connection between selfness and corporeality, individuals would 
not feel the need to express their identities, adhere to social standards, create 
identification with others, or signal political commitments on and through their bodies. 
Through this rhetorically constructed and upheld vision of corporeality, the human body 
has become, at once, a fixation and a distraction. The cultural obsession with bodies is 
evident upon first glance at a billboard, magazine, television program or commercial, or 
upon the first step into the classroom, workplace, or gym. More—we have become our 
bodies. Our happiness is our shrinking waistline, our contentment is our flawless skin, 
and our success is the adherence o f our physique to cultural standards. In short, our sense 
o f self and our health is not in how we feel, but how we look. If the two do not match up.
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we do the best we ean to use our bodies to mask our inner turmoil or shortcomings 
because it is that “se lf’ that is most readily available to the other.
It is in this sense that bodies have become a distraction. Even when the 
connection between selves and bodies is acknowledged as rhetorical fantasy, an 
individual must exist in this world and a subject’s constant “becoming” is dependent on 
the resources available to him/her. Whether or not one believes that the human body is, in 
fact, connected to their authentic inner self, he or she either devotes time and attention to 
their bodies to socially “pass” as a desired version of him/her self or consciously uses 
their bodies as a tool to reject this notion. The physical body is more easily modified than 
an individual’s conception o f his or her inner essence is. Likewise, a social and/or 
political condition is more easily modified than an ideological commitment to selfness 
and corporeality.
It is within this contour that political body projects occur, modifying bodies not to 
meet socially accepted versions o f corporeality, but instead using the articulation of 
selves and bodies in order to modify social and political environments. Gerard Hauser 
writes, for example, o f “the body’s capacity to evoke responses to their peril and cause 
from a witnessing public, to bring pressure to bear on a disciplining authority, and 
sometimes even to overturn the plans o f their oppressors” (“Body Rhetoric” 137). In this 
context Hauser discusses “rhetorical and political dimensions to pain” as bodies in pain 
have the power to “form deep and powerful identification among an audience that feels 
empathy for the sufferer’s anguish” (135). In other words, because o f the cultural 
infatuation with bodies, peculiar or shocking treatment or formation o f bodies attracts 
attention which can be leveraged into political action.
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The rest o f this chapter is devoted to the description and analysis o f body projects 
that are politically charged as a result o f the assumptions outlined in the first two 
chapters. These practices rely on society’s inclination to articulate bodies with selves and 
capitalize on the social valuing o f bodies in order to affect social and political conditions. 
An analysis o f these practices will further demonstrate how the meaningfulness o f bodies 
is rhetorically constituted and constrained. Once the Western vision of corporeality is 
recognized as rhetorical construction, the ability for bodies to be more politically 
meaningful and useful is expanded and the rhetorical power o f human bodies ean be 
maximized.
The next section presents a rhetorical analysis of the documentary of a man who 
voluntarily makes himself fat as a statement of protest against the fast food industry. This 
discussion will illustrate the reliance o f his political body modification project on 
strategic rhetorical framing, a cultural fascination with bodies and valuing o f specific 
types of bodies, and an articulation of the human form with the intangible essence of the 
self.
The Politics o f Fatness: Intentional Obesitv and Fast Food Culture
In 2004, a documentary attacking the United State’s obsession with fast food 
premiered at the Sundance Film Festival in Park City, Utah. Soon after, the movie gained 
momentum with audiences and media alike, sparking public interest, controversy, and 
ultimately provoking change in major fast food corporations, social programs, and school 
systems. The documentary, Morgan Spurlock’s Super Size Me. did not provide 
Americans with information that was not already available to them. The rhetorical
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manner in which the information was presented, however, is what marked the 
documentary as note-worthy, framing the issues and arguments forwarded by Spurlock as 
urgent, compelling, and fascinating. Morgan Spurlock’s claim is mundane and simple: 
fast food is harmful to your health. His method, however, capitalizes on Western 
culture’s fascination with bodies and stigma o f fatness to command attention and demand 
change.
“America has now become the fattest nation in the world,” Spurlock states 
ominously at the beginning o f the film. Spurlock and his audience understand that fatness 
is commonly viewed as a negative physical attribute and is thereby scolding Americans 
their socially disgraceful bodies. According to the film, “37 percent of American children 
and adolescents are carrying too much fat and two out of every three adults are 
overweight or obese.” He immediately frames fatness as a problem which he later calls a 
“crisis” and “a national epidemic.” The issues addressed by the documentary are highly 
visible in the society in which we live, especially since they deal with the presence o f big 
corporations, advertisements, physical buildings, and bodies. These “problems” are 
material and we are surrounded by them every day. Spurlock’s notion is that fast food 
corporations and fast food “culture” are to blame for America’s problematic growing 
waistline. This perspective gives most responsibility to the major fast food distributors 
and views them as the reason for the cultural conditions that foster fatness. This framing, 
then, gives less responsibility to the individual who makes “poor” lifestyle choices, while 
continuing to condemn fatness on bodies.
To stage an outcry against the “obesity epidemic,” Spurlock decides to take 
matters onto his own body. In response to a legal ease in which a McDonald’s plaintiff
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argues that no direct causality can be established between their food and the health 
problems of those who have begun to sue the company, Spurlock concocted his plan. In 
the documentary, Spurlock wages a 30-day battle against the most prominent fast food 
chain, McDonald’s, using his body as his primary weapon. His experiment is to 
“sacrifice” his own body to fast food culture in order to illuminate the dangers o f fast 
food to the American consumer. “What would happen if  I ate nothing but McDonald’s 
tor 30 days straight,” he asks. “Would I suddenly be on the fast track to becoming an 
obese American? Would it be unreasonably dangerous? Let’s find out. I’m ready. Super 
Size me.” He clearly makes it clear at the offset that his primary tool of argumentation is 
the modification o f his body. As previously mentioned, Spurlock’s argument is not a new 
one, so the mere presentation of data supporting his claims is not enough to lend cultural 
urgency to his cause. To appeal to the seemingly apathetic public, then, he submits his 
body to a spectacular experiment that will explicitly alter his physical form. His body, 
then, is used as “a source o f evidence and argument, an exemplification or what Aristotle 
would have called argument by paradigma, or example” (Hauser 138). He relies on the 
manipulation o f his once socially desirable form into one that is on the “fast track” to 
being socially grotesque to jar his audience and as “p roof’ o f his claims.
To make his point, Spurlock confines his diet to only McDonald’s products for 
thirty days with four rules: 1) He must eat three square meals a day, no exceptions; 2) He 
can only eat what is available over the counter at McDonald’s for those three meals; 3) 
He must “Super Size” his meal when asked; and 4) He must eat every item on the menu 
at least once. The documentary follows his “progress” for the month, as well as follows 
him around the country while he visits the “fattest” cities in the nation and interviews
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experts in various fields pertaining to health, fast food, and obesity. The modification of 
his body becomes a particular case through which he will show causality between fast 
food and fatness, as well as an attention grabbing device through which to lure media and 
public interest.
Spurlock began his 30-day trial with a body that can be likened to ideal: white, 
male, and thin. Before he begins his diet o f only fast food, he goes to three separate 
doctors, a nutritionist, and a fitness expert to assess the preliminary state of his body. 
These scenes proudly display his body as it is being poked, analyzed, and evaluated by 
these experts. All specialists agree that he is in “good,” “great,” “perfect,” and even 
“outstanding” health and is “above average fitness for his age group.” Spurlock’s body at 
the beginning o f the movie is offered as a symbol o f the epitome o f health. His weight is 
considered to be healthy, his cholesterol levels are low, his kidney and liver functions are 
optimal, and his diet is balanced. This is supplemented by his discussion o f all of the 
vices he has given up and the conscious effort made by Spurlock to attain this somewhat 
ideal physique. He explains that he has given up drugs and smoking, completely abstains 
from alcohol, walks every day, and eats organic foods. This portion o f the movie clearly 
functions on the premises that human bodies are socially valuable and that continual 
“maintenance” is required to keep them as such. Spurlock has done this throughout his 
life, dedicating himself to a lifestyle that would discipline his body in accordance to 
society’s standards.
Spurlock’s body modification is clearly political in nature as he offers up this 
symbol o f desired healthfulness—his own body— in order to influence his cultural 
environment.^ Spurlock creates a spectacle o f his body modification and supplements this
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exhibition with data that justify his actions both personally and socially in order to gain a 
desired response from his audience. Without the availability o f images o f Spurlock’s 
body, the public would not be interested. Because we live in a media culture, the 
American public is bombarded with thousands o f images and persuasive messages a day 
attempting to persuade and influence us. Spurlock creates a spectacle to separate his 
political message from others and capitalizes on the public interest in bodies to lend 
urgency to his cause. His spectacle o f obesity, however, must be rhetorically framed to 
lend political significance to his body project in order to differentiate his practices from 
other displays o f fatness.
The public, in turn, cannot validate Spurlock’s intentional “self-harm” without his 
explicit political framing of his modification. Not only does he explicitly give meaning to 
his actions by describing the conditions o f his “protest” and the intentions o f his 
experiment, but also through the framing of the act of modification through his discussion 
of the physical and mental anguish experienced as a result o f his “MeDiet.” Spurlock 
needs to make clear that the conditions resulting from his body modification are 
negatively affecting his body and his mind in order to provoke a desired response from 
his audience. Further, his voluntary subjection to such conditions for the “greater good” 
exalts his practices while condemning the practices he is mimicking.
For example, the second day o f his experiment he attempts to eat a Super-Sized 
quarter pound cheeseburger, Super-Sized French fries, and a Super-Sized Coea-eola.
After 20 minutes of struggling to finally finish the meal he describes his discomfort, 
sweating, nausea, and bloating and eventually vomits through the open window of his 
car. He has intentionally made himself sick to prove a point, and his condition only gets
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worse as the experiment continues. Before the end of his session, several doctors and his 
girlfriend (a vegan chef) beg him to quit his experiment and warn him that he could be 
causing irreversible damage to his body that could have fatal results. On day 22 Spurlock 
gives a testimonial at 2:00 a.m. describing trouble sleeping and breathing and explains 
that he is worried to continue his project because he is experiencing chest pain. The next 
morning his general practitioner warns Spurlock that he is pickling his liver and the 
results could be life threatening. He advises Spurlock to abandon his efforts because he is 
explicitly making himself sick and can easily stop the process by stopping the 
experiment. Spurlock ignores his doctor’s pleas and even refuses his advice to take an 
aspirin a day to avoid coronary problems. Under any other condition, his acts would be 
read as self-destructive and potentially symptomatic of mental illness. He voluntarily 
subjects himself to pain and discomfort and modifies his body contrary to normative 
standards, but his actions are not read as self-mutilation but rather as political protest. His 
self-harm is framed instead as acts of near-martyrdom, as he is “sacrificing” his body and 
health for the public good.
Another doctor tells him that he is developing physiological signs o f addiction to 
the fast food. The framing o f Spurlock’s body as becoming dependent of the fast food 
makes him (through his body) seem vulnerable and docile. As his body becomes 
dependent on the food, so does his mind, constructing both as being weak and “at risk.” 
Though seemingly intended to be in defense of those dependent on fast food, this actually 
contributes to the social stigmatization o f fat. This move pathologizes the drive for fast 
food, and thus, the physical state o f fatness. This pathologization o f fatness further 
enhances the stigma placed on the physical trait while Spurlock voluntarily subjects
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himself to this shame. This move frames “regular” fatness as a signifier o f lack o f self- 
restraint, laziness, and even addiction while further framing his own practices as acts of 
heroism and martyrdom. Further, Spurlock’s girlfriend discusses the negative impact the 
experiment is having on their sex life. She notes fatigue, loss in stamina, and eventually, 
a decrease in libido as a result o f the physical changes he is undergoing. This allows the 
persuasiveness o f his body to capitalize on Western culture’s sanctification of male 
heterosexuality. According to authors Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, Western 
culture is characterized by heteronormativity.''According to Lauren Berlant, 
heteronormativity is a “fixed sign in the national language” (“Live Sex Acts” 297) and is 
inherent in our national identity. Fleteronormativity, then, is thought of as both a trait of a 
legitimate citizen and a liberty to be exercised by legitimate citizens. The fact that 
Spurlock’s deliberate fatness has detracted from his ability to exhibit this prized trait of 
maleness further frames his acts of modification as sacrificial for the greater good, as it 
indefinitely detracts from his legitimacy as a citizen.
Spurlock’s body, once a symbol o f normative health, is intentionally modified 
inside and out in order to, in turn, modify his environment. The process of this 
modification is charted and made highly visible to his audience and sensationalized 
through the use o f media in order to demand attention. By the end of the 30-day 
experiment, Spurlock has added 25 pounds to his once “normal” physique, as well 
increasing his body fat by 7 percent, and adding 65 points to his cholesterol level. He has 
also experienced “severe damage” to his liver and kidneys and doubled his risk of heart 
disease. In short, he has taken a socially desirable body and transformed it into one that is 
socially undesirable. This “undesirable” body (his end result, though overweight for his
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height, is still below the average body mass index for his age group) is prominently 
displayed on a seale in a skin-tight American flag imprinted Speedo for all to see. This 
vision links the symbol o f the American flag, which normally connotes positive values, 
with the negative symbol o f fatness. His exhibition suggests that fast food culture is 
tarnishing America’s dominant mythology, and that we ean reject this negative 
association through our own bodily performances.
Spurlock’s spectacle of obesity, in fact, succeeded. Though Spurlock did not 
definitively put an end to the “obesity epidemic,” put McDonald’s out o f business, or 
keep customers away from the golden arches forever, he was able to gain visibility and 
influence fast food culture. Soon after the film gained national attention, McDonald’s 
removed the “Super Size” option from its menu and added the “Go Active” adult Happy 
Meal. McDonald’s also developed a new strategic advertising campaign that emphasized 
their healthier menu options. Spurlock’s spectacle also engaged audiences, raising 
awareness about fast food corporations and their products while persuading audience 
members to make healthier lifestyle choices and encouraging them to, if not abandon fast 
food all together, seek alternatives whenever possible.
Spurlock’s use o f his body to enact a political cause is clearly founded in the 
assumption that bodies are to be used to achieve desired social aims. The success of his 
spectacle is dependent on the public fixation on physicality and the dominant reading of 
bodies as tangible selves. Though functioning within these cultural assumptions,
Spurlock used them to further a political agenda. Spurlock’s ease, however, does not 
stand alone. Similarly, other body modification projects utilize these same assumptions to 
manipulate and influence environments. The next section will interrogate other body
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modification projects that manipulate bodies to manipulate environments. Specifically, 
the following analysis foeuses on two explicitly political practices of body 
modification— hunger strikes and acts o f self immolation. Discussion of these practices 
will further illustrate the reliance o f political body projects on cultural assumptions that 
link corporeality with interiority, and treat the body as a malleable apparatus to be used in 
social transactions.
The Rhetoric of Mortalitv: The Polities o f Bodilv Sacrifice
Based on the major premises o f this project, I argue that any act o f body 
modification has the potential to become political in nature. For the purposes of 
demonstration and analysis o f such body projects, however, 1 will focus on two other 
practices o f body modification that are explicitly political in nature through the framing 
of their intent, the social reading o f their practice, and through social and political effect. 
These body projects are hunger strikes and self-immolation.
Like Spurlock’s spectacle o f obesity, the hunger strike is an intentional act of 
body modification that uses the manipulation o f weight and the threat of illness or death 
to seek social and/or political change. According to Gerard Hauser, “the hunger strike is 
an attempt at subverting a superior power by becoming helpless before it” (“Body 
Rhetoric” 139). Hauser asserts that self-starvation is a rhetorical technique that produces 
a type o f body “that can capture our attention by the sheer spectacle o f its wasting away” 
(139). The hunger strike has been a form of non-violent protest for hundreds o f years.
The most famous eases o f non-violent protest through self-starvation were those of 
Mahatma Gandhi who engaged in several hunger strikes to struggle for justice and
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independence in India. Aeeording to Code Pink, a social organization of “women for 
peace,” the influence o f a hunger strike “rests on the seriousness o f the issue, and the 
gravity o f putting one’s body on the line.”  ^The seriousness o f an issue, however, is 
relative. Hunger strikes use the spectacle o f a physically deteriorating body to make an 
otherwise overlooked issue important to society through an exploited cultural interest in 
corporeality. Incidentally, Code Pink has mobilized “Troops Home Fast!” a collective of 
women in opposition to the Iraq war. These women have camped out on the White House 
lawn in staged fasts in an attempt to “end this illegal, unjust, and deadly war.” Though 
the message o f Code Pink does not differ from that o f many other anti-war campaigns, 
the manner through which they communicate this message is much different. By putting 
their bodies “on the line,” these women are not only demanding public attention and 
demonstrating the importance of this issue to the interest group, but are also lending 
urgency to the issue through the imminent threat o f bodily harm and death.
The attention demanded by a spectacle o f starvation depends on the predefined 
premise that the physical state o f bodies is indicative of the metaphysical state o f the self. 
This presupposition frames the deteriorating body as a deteriorating self, powerless and 
in the hands o f the higher authority. This strategy “poses a moral dilemma to the 
authorities; either yield to save [a] life or, by refusing to fold, stand publicly condemned 
for [their] moral intransigence” (Hauser 139). Clearly, the logic behind the enacting and 
interpretation o f hunger striking rests on basic assumptions about the body as it is 
assumed to function in relation to the self and to the other. The striker envisions his/her 
body as a political tool that ean be manipulated to achieve desired social responses and 
assumes that the body will be an effective rhetorical device through which he/she ean
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influence the environment. Further, the effieaey of the body in provoking social and 
political change depends on the underlying articulation of corporeality with selfness 
which places the body at the center for social relations.
One underlying necessity for the hunger strike to be successful in the modification 
of one’s environment, however, is a witnessing public to interpret the act. This 
interpretation is underscored by cultural assumptions of the uses and functions o f the 
body in personal, social, and political situations. Because of the dependency on a 
sympathetic witnessing public, the hunger striker must frame the body in such a way that 
provokes a desired response from that public. This framing should provide adequate 
signification for the practice, indicate the subject o f protest and the conditions under 
which it is to occur, and create identification with the witnessing public. This is what 
lends the act o f body modification its political signification as opposed to a stigmatized 
association of mental illness or disease.
For example, in 1995 a group o f students went on a hunger strike to garner public 
interest and support in the development o f a new program at Northwestern University. 
Before the students resorted to the bodily spectacle o f self-starvation, the efforts o f the 
Asian American Advisory Board (AAAB), a student organization at Northwestern 
University, to establish an Asian American Studies Program at the university were 
continuously thwarted despite President Henry S. Bienen’s assertion that he had “an open 
mind about [the program].”  ^After several months o f the university administration 
considering the proposal and making excuses for the stalling of the program, the AAAB 
and other concerned students embarked on a hunger strike to attract attention to the issue 
and add urgency and momentum to their requests. The hunger strikers camped outside of
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a campus landmark, gave press interviews, and even made a documentary noting their 
cause and their progress. The president responded in a letter: “I am concerned about you 
and the means o f dissent you have chosen to support your proposal for an Asian 
American Studies program, and particularly so because it puts you at risk. Your safety 
and welfare are important to us.”  ^He concludes the letter urging the students once again 
to abandon their strike and to “make a commitment to us, by working with us, to bring 
the Asian American experience and culture to the curriculum in a permanent, meaningful 
way.” The hunger strike lasted 21 days and attracted much student, faculty, and media 
attention. Though the program was not officially created until 1999, by the end of the 
strike the university had committed to developing the program and began discussing 
timelines and funds.
The progress made by the AAAB was not due to the urgency o f the establishment 
o f their desired program. Rather, it was the public’s arousal o f interest in the manner of 
protest that built the momentum of the AAAB’s cause. The students who embarked on 
the hunger strike worked within the public fixation on physicality and envisioned their 
bodies as political tools that ean be used and manipulated to reach specific ends. Clearly, 
the hunger striking o f the Northwestern students functions in a similar capacity to the 
spectacle o f obesity enacted by Spurlock in his documentary. Both acts o f body 
modification depend on a normative conception o f “valued” bodies and how they 
function in relation to the self and to the other. This conception is used by the modifier in 
order to exploit this value to gain attention and concern from an audience. The practice of 
modification is contrary to cultural logic and the spectacle of an intentionally obese or 
starved body confuses and alarms the interpreter o f the act. Though the cultural
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fasci nation with bodies is what makes this method of rhetorical performance enticing and 
effective, it is the framing o f the act that lends the body political agency. An anorexic 
body is altered in the same fashion as a hunger striker’s body, but the framing of the 
practice is what differentiates the two acts o f self-starvation. In light of this framing, one 
starved body signifies a disturbed self while the other signifies an emancipated political 
self.
These same premises are at the heart o f other politically charged yet socially 
outrageous spectacles o f bodily sacrifiée. Self-immolation, the act of surrendering one’s 
mortality through bodily sacrifice, is often carried out by setting one’s own body on fire. 
This act is alleged to have commenced with Thieh Quang Due, a Vietnamese Buddhist 
monk, in a public protest against political oppression in Saigon. Since this symbolic act, 
American activists have mimicked this practice in anti-war protesting of the Vietnam 
War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War.*' The practice o f self-immolation has its roots in 
Buddhism. The Lotus Sutra, a Buddhist holy text, is said to “provide the doctrinal basis” 
for self-immolation as it describes a key figure offering his own body to the Buddha 
through “various acts of self-mutilation, including burning his body” (Slosberg, “A 
Question o f Violence” 25). The origins o f this practice alone, then, illustrate the 
practice’s dependency on an assumed linkage between spirituality and the human form.
The most notable American act o f self-immolation was carried out by Norman 
Morrison on November 2, 1965 in protest to the Vietnam War. Though it was the second 
American self-immolation to occur in protest to the Vietnam War (Alice Herz was the 
first), Morrison’s display generated more attention and had greater impact. Morrison’s 
self-inflicted death took place at the Pentagon, where, accompanied by his one-year-old
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daughter Emily, he doused himself with gasoline and set him self on fire. This spectacle 
o f political suicide occurred within 100 feet o f the office of a man instrumental in the 
continued U.S. involvement in the war— Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamera.
Though eye-witness accounts of the event contradict each other and Morrison did not 
leave a suicide note explicitly outlining the meanings of his acts, the spectacle of 
Morrison’s body engulfed in flames drew international attention, and friends, family, and 
media alike described the event as “a deeply personal action against the Vietnam War.”'^  
The day after his political suicide, Morrison’s wife received a letter from her husband 
postmarked from Washington D.C. which read: “Know that I love thee but must act for 
the children in the priest’s village.”’® Anne Morrison, Norman’s wife, later recalled her 
husband’s increasing concern about the U.S involvement in the war and his belief that “if 
the war continued it would take a heavy toll on the conscience o f America.” ’ ’ Morrison 
died for his cause, but his baby daughter survived.
Morrison’s self-immolation did not end the United State’s involvement in the war, 
but his protest was recognized by the North Vietnamese government and the people of 
Vietnam “were profoundly moved by his sacrifice” (Biggs, “The Transnational Diffusion 
o f Protest by Self-Immolation” 26). The government has even gone so far as to issue a 
stamp in his honor, name a street after him, and his practice “became an inspiration for 
further immolations in South Vietnam” (Biggs 26). To this day, Quakers, students, and 
anti-war activists in America commemorate the day he took his life and consider his act 
o f suicide a heroic display o f anti-war activism.
The honor Morrison received from the Vietnamese, as well as the continued 
recognition Morrison receives all over the world as a hero and an advocate for peace,
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could not have been achieved without his spectacular rhetoric o f dissent. Morrison’s 
actions captured worldwide attention and made the violence and tragedy “more 
immediate for the American public” (Biggs 30). The implicit link between self- 
immolation and spirituality fosters a public reading of Morrison’s suicide as an action of 
a spiritually sound self, lending credibility to his cause and vindicating him from a 
normatively condemned act. The understanding of a spiritually sound self is central to the 
public’s exalting o f a practice that is generally thought of as “sinful.” Further, the routine 
articulation of selfness with physicality contributes to the horror of the spectacle— instead 
of merely watching the destruction of a material entity, this assumption leads the 
watching public to believe they are witnessing the ruin o f a soul— a grieving, pained soul. 
The death of his body (spirit) is interpreted as a great sacrifice, as Morrison has given up 
his most valuable commodity to a political cause. His selfness (body) has been destroyed 
in public view, making the object o f the practice’s perceived signification—those 
annihilated in the Vietnam W ar—have greater meaning to the reader of the act.
Clearly, the acts performed by the students at Northwestern University and 
byNorman Morrison at the pentagon go about very different ways to affect very different 
environments. The body, however, is the locus o f political agency in both cases. Further, 
both cases use spectacular forms o f body modification to draw public attention and to 
conduct political action. These practices parallel the spectacle of obesity enacted by 
Morgan Spurlock in his documentary. As demonstrated in all three o f these eases, the 
ability to use the body as a political tool rests within the cultural assumptions discussed in 
chapters two and three o f this project. The success of political body projects relies on the 
use of these assumptions, while the enactor simultaneously deconstructs them.
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Conclusions
Whether or not these practices are perceived as positive or negative, their 
effectiveness cannot be denied. All of the aforementioned cases describe acts of body 
modification that somehow modify or influence the practitioner’s surrounding 
environment. The understanding of the body as a political device stems from culturally 
upheld beliefs about how the body functions in relation to the self and to the other. 
Because of the assumed relationship between selfness and corporeality, bodies are used 
as tools o f the self to reach desired aims. These presumed relations are cultural fictions 
that ultimately constrain the body’s potential uses, functions, and significations within 
certain contexts.
The politicized body, however, cannot exist extra-eulturally. The ability for a 
body to have political significance depends on its social reading within a cultural context. 
The effectiveness of political body modification projects, then, depends on an ability to 
work within these confines while simultaneously rethinking these fundamental 
assumptions about selfness and corporeality. Spurlock’s experiment, the students at 
Northwestern, and Norman Morrison, for instance, would not have captured the attention 
o f the media and the general public without the public’s fascination with bodies. The 
exposure these spectacles received is a result o f this national fixation on physicality and 
the social valuing of certain types o f bodies. Fueled by an ideology that assumes that 
bodies publicize our inner worth, these projects encourage the normative social reading 
o f these practices— an intentional modification o f a valuable body into one that is 
“worthless”—in order to startle the audience and provoke confusion and awe. These
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“protests” are sensationalized because their methods are to intentionally depreciate the 
value of a socially precious asset. In so doing, however, they actually cash in on this 
value—they use the assumptions discussed in the first two chapters to influence their 
environments.
The social fixation on physicality is linked to an assumed relationship with the 
essential self, but the individual embarking on a politically charged body project does not 
necessarily see it this way. In order to effectively carry out the practice to achieve 
specific aims, the modifier disarticulates selfness from physicality in order to use the 
body in its full political capacity. Though unhealthy, frail, and/or deformed bodies pull at 
the public’s conscience and remind the spectator o f deficiency (mental, physical, social, 
political) and even death, to become a political act the modifier must disarticulate self 
from body to consciously perform the act and gain authority in the public eye. If the 
political modifier’s “se lf’ is socially perceived as ill or unsound then the act o f body 
modification loses public significance. In order for political body projects to be effective, 
the public must be concerned for the state o f the modifier’s self and body while 
convinced of the soundness o f the practices being carried out. The enactor o f the practice, 
then, must simultaneously separate his/her “se lf’ from physical form in order to sacrifice 
the body for a perceived greater good, while capitalizing on the assumption that the two 
are inextricably linked for rhetorical effect. The effectiveness o f such spectacles depends 
on the public’s inclination to mystify acts o f modification that are seemingly incongruous 
with cultural assumptions while continuing to function within them.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION
The substantive chapters of this thesis provide an in-depth look at several 
practices o f body modification that illustrate how the body is understood to function 
personally, socially, and politically in Western culture. The cases of Dennis Avner, Frank 
Marino, Cindy Jackson, Mike Kendall, Morgan Spurlock, the AAAB, Norman Morrison, 
and the like are all very different instances of body modification that, when analyzed 
together, demonstrate a set o f cultural assumptions that animate how the body will be 
conceptualized, used, and socially read. These assumptions have situated the body to 
function as a publication, socialization, and political device. The purpose o f this thesis, 
then, has been to demystify and complicate normative conceptions of the body and its 
modification as it is presumed to function in contemporary society in order to “free up” 
the body’s potential to be rhetorically meaningful in new ways.
Chapter two, “No Body Knows the Real Me; Interiorizing the Body,” discussed 
the routine articulation o f the body with interiority, or the rhetorical scene o f selfhood. 
Throughout the analysis, I demonstrated how this articulation can be used to collapse the 
continuum o f body modification practices. I have demonstrated how very dissimilar acts, 
at least at some level, utilize this conceptualization o f the body. Further, 1 reveal how this 
association equates many practices that, at the level of intentionality, should not be 
likened. It is in this way that assumptions about how the body relates to the essential self
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constrict potential rhetorical uses o f the body because of the limits it places on personal 
and social readings of the human form. Bodily practices o f selfhood are cultural practices 
that produce and are produced by their own materiality. Different types o f body projects, 
then, are social categories that are rhetorically constructed and thus can be rhetorically 
deconstructed.
In other words, this chapter examines and problematizes the presumed connection 
between the physical and the metaphysical in order to explore the rhetorical potentiality 
o f the body. My argument is that there is no necessary relation between meaning and 
practice. This familiar connection between the two fuels practices that ideologically 
reaffirm a fantasy of corporeality that is necessarily related to a “core” self. This fantasy 
presupposes that there is an essential self, it can be realized, and that it is (or should be) 
accessible to others through the exterior physical form. The cases discussed in this 
chapter illustrated these assumptions at work, as well as began to show ruptures between 
these associations.
Though it is not the purpose o f this project to measure the existence o f an 
essential interior self, I do wish to recognize that a cultural attachment to this entity is 
rhetorically perpetuated through our bodily practices. The inclination to relate one’s 
physical condition to the condition o f the self is the result o f an ideological assumption 
about how the body can and should function. This articulation promotes the conscious 
and intentional manipulation o f the physical form to communicate our perceptions of our 
self and identity. Clearly, these effects are the products o f the rhetorical environments in 
which we live. The social understanding (or misunderstanding) and acceptance (or
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rejection) of body projects is determined by how each instance is rhetorically framed both 
by the individual and their cultural context.
These self-perpetuating cultural assumptions give rise to issues o f sociality. As a 
direct result o f the assumed link between the inner self and the body, public subjects 
consciously manipulate the states o f their bodies to reflect feelings o f interiority. Based 
on these assumptions, body modification becomes socially valued as an expression of 
selfhood— a material practice that is symptomatic o f the transcendental state within. Once 
bodies are envisioned as having certain properties and associations, they are read 
intertextually with other bodies according to a certain set o f standards. Thus, the third 
chapter, “Modifying Society: Interiority and Corporeal Sociality,” interrogated the use of 
the body as a social device based on this intertextual relation. This chapter argued that the 
social “realities” o f bodies are cultural constructions that depend on the interplay of 
rhetoric, hierarchy, and power. Bodies exist, I argue, within a rhetorical hierarchy of 
corporeality that favors certain modes of physicality and methods of its production, 
maintenance, and manipulation.
In other words, chapter three illuminates how the routine articulation o f bodies 
with selfness has charged bodies with social significance and value. The cases described 
in this chapter demonstrate a belief that the body either is a manifestation of the interior 
self, or that it will be socially read as such. Because o f this belief, bodies have been 
articulated with qualities of competence, character, and inner worth. This association 
situates bodies as the materialization o f dominant themes in American ideology, 
determining what is culturally honored and valued (and what is not). The material 
transference of such worth perpetuates this myth, which in turn pressures individuals to
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be conscious o f societal standards o f physicality. In short, within the cultural “reality” of 
the human body lies a rhetorical vision of corporeal socialization. The shape, form, and 
manner of production of a body, then, determine how bodies, and thus, selves, are 
socialized.
The issues discussed in chapters two and three culminate in a discussion of 
political body projects in chapter four, “Political Selves, Political Bodies: Modifying the 
Body Politic.” This chapter provided a discussion o f the body as a locus of political 
action and signification, and illustrates how such agency is drawn from assumptions 
linking the body with selfness, sociality, and citizenship. The discussion o f political body 
projects in this chapter worked toward opening up new avenues for conceptualizing the 
body within the confines o f the aforementioned assumptions. Political body projects 
begin to demonstrate how routine articulations between the essential se lf the external 
self, and the social self can be rhetorically productive and politically useful. Though these 
practices rely on the dominant associations I have argued to deconstruct, their ability to 
modify conditions and environments depends both on the use of these assumptions and 
their disarticulation.
The purpose o f chapter four, then, was to illustrate a “way in” to a nuanced vision 
o f rhetorical body projects. Though I have argued for a disarticulation of the body from 
the essential self and social worth— in short, meaning from practice— it is impossible to 
understand the body aculturally. As previously stated, bodies exist intertextually with 
other bodies within a larger cultural context o f status and power. It is unreasonable, then, 
to ask for a complete cultural reconceptualization of the uses and functions o f the body. 
My recommendation would be no better, as I to am bound by my own ideology, and thus.
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so are my notions about how the body can and should function personally, socially, and 
politically. I do argue, however, for a rethinking o f the social categorization of body 
projects as a cultural fiction, and forward a more “radically empirical” way to look at the 
uses o f bodies and the meanings of body modification projects.
I have, to this point, argued that the distinctions between self-maintenance, body 
modification, and self-mutilation are rhetorical designations. That is not to say that 
particular body projects are not productive or destructive. As I illustrated in chapter four, 
acts that are socially read as “destructive,” “harmful,” or “unhealthy” can actually be 
used to achieve aims that are socially acknowledged as being “productive,” “useful,” or 
“industrious.” The point I have made, then, is that the rhetorical significance of a body 
project cannot be determined a priori. For example. Anorexia is socially frowned upon 
while hunger strikes are viewed as being executed to achieve a dignified goal. Both 
practices are the same, but their meanings, and more specifically, their effects, are very 
different. Both projects are read as harmful, but one is using that assumption while 
disarticulating self from body in order to achieve a desired aim. As I previously argued, 
the effectiveness o f political body modification projects depends on an ability to 
capitalize on cultural assumptions— in effect, rhetorically use them while simultaneously 
rethinking their roles in the body modification process.
The ability for these projects to have a social or political effect, though, depends 
on a cultural fixation on bodies that is perpetuated by the assumptions discussed in this 
project. The rhetorical vision of the body that our society holds simultaneously restricts 
its potential uses, while allowing for these projects to produce effects. Fueled by an 
ideology that assumes that bodies publicize our inner worth, political projects encourage
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the normative social reading o f these practices in order to startle the audience and arouse 
confusion and awe. Without this sensationalization of bodies, these projects would not 
provoke the response necessary to influence cultural environments.
So the conclusion of this project rests at a paradox. On one hand, it is necessary to 
recognize cultural myths about the body in order to move beyond them. Assuming that 
the physical state of the body is reminiscent o f an essential inner being binds body 
modification projects that could otherwise be rhetorically useful and effective in other 
ways. Further, assuming that a particular act o f body modification is “destructive” or 
“trivial” before examining practice, intention, and effect would be negligent.
Bodies and body modification certainly deserve further analysis and criticism 
from rhetoricians. The body is bound up in discourse, ideology, power, and effect. This 
project has begun to shed light on the sheer rhetoricity o f the body, but further 
investigation is required to unveil and unleash the human body’s potential to be 
rhetorically significant in new ways.
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